Results 171 to 180 of about 1,214,649 (366)

Convexity, Differential Equations, and Games [PDF]

Theoretical and experimental studies of noncooperative games increasingly recognize Nash equilibrium as a limiting outcome of players‘ repeated interaction. This note, while sharing that view, illustrates and advocates combined use of convex optimization
Sjur Didrik Flåm
core  

Data Portability and Interoperability Between Digital Platforms

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We examine the effects of regulation requiring data portability and interoperability in digital platform competition. Data portability and interoperability have the effect of eliminating switching costs between platforms and enlarging network externalities but increasing the risk of data breaches.
Jeong‐Yoo Kim
wiley   +1 more source

Bank Capital and Misconduct Incentives

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper studies large banks' incentives to engage in misconduct by abusing their dominant position in the market for loans and by mis‐selling an add‐on financial product to depositors. We draw new connections between stability‐focused prudential regulation and misconduct by studying the impact of higher capital requirements on misconduct ...
Jacob Seifert
wiley   +1 more source

From rationality to cooperativeness: The totally mixed Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. [PDF]

PLoS One, 2017
Menshikov IS, Shklover AV, Babkina TS, Myagkov MG.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Strong and safe Nash equilibrium in some repeated 3-player games [PDF]

, 2017
Tadeusz Kufel, Sławomir Plaskacz, Joanna Zwierzchowska   +2 more
openalex   +1 more source

Cross Ownership Versus Merger Under Product Differentiation

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We compare the merger participants' profits under a merger and under cross ownership (CO) in an oligopolistic industry with horizontally differentiated products. We show under Cournot competition that the merger participants would be better off under a symmetric CO than a merger.
Arijit Mukherjee
wiley   +1 more source

Nash Equilibrium of Social-Learning Agents in a Restless Multiarmed Bandit Game. [PDF]

Sci Rep, 2017
Nakayama K, Hisakado M, Mori S.
europepmc   +1 more source

Protecting Intermediate Innovations When Ideas Are Scarce: Patents or Secrecy?

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Patenting an intermediate research innovation can lead to competition for the development of a final commercial innovation and potentially induce wasteful duplicative R&D efforts. This study examines the effects of different protection strategies and patent life on the incentives to protect an intermediate innovation by considering a two‐stage
Bonwoo Koo, Jangho Yang, Brian D. Wright
wiley   +1 more source

Local Nash equilibrium in social networks. [PDF]

Sci Rep, 2014
Zhang Y, Aziz-Alaoui MA, Bertelle C, Guan J.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source