Results 81 to 90 of about 150,054 (288)

Nash equilibrium set function in dyadic mixed-strategy games [PDF]

open access: yesComputer Science Journal of Moldova, 2017
Dyadic two-person mixed strategy games form the case for which Nash equilibrium sets can be determined simply. In this paper the set of Nash equilibria in a particular game is determined as an intersection of graphs of optimal reaction mappings of the ...
Valeriu Ungureanu
doaj  

Discrete-Time Multi-Player Games Based on Off-Policy Q-Learning

open access: yesIEEE Access, 2019
In this paper, an off-policy game Q-learning algorithm is proposed for solving linear discrete-time non-zero sum multi-player game problems. Unlike the existing Q-learning methods for solving the Riccati equation by on-policy learning approaches for ...
Jinna Li, Zhenfei Xiao, Ping Li
doaj   +1 more source

The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity

open access: yesDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2020
In this paper, a dynamic rent-seeking game incorporating policymaker cost and competition intensity is considered. On the basis of the political environment and rent-seekers with incomplete information set, the locally asymptotic stability of Nash ...
Yu Yu, Jia-Qian Xu
doaj   +1 more source

Beyond Truth‐Telling: A Replication Study on School Choice

open access: yesJournal of Applied Econometrics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non‐truth‐telling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even when the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm is employed.
Tommy Andersson   +4 more
wiley   +1 more source

Count Data Models With Heterogeneous Peer Effects Under Rational Expectations

open access: yesJournal of Applied Econometrics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper develops a peer effect model for count responses under rational expectations. The model accounts for heterogeneity in peer effects across groups based on observed characteristics. Identification is based on the linear model condition that requires the presence of friends of friends who are not direct friends.
Aristide Houndetoungan
wiley   +1 more source

Successful Nash Equilibrium Agent for a Three-Player Imperfect-Information Game

open access: yesGames, 2018
Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in two-player zero-
Sam Ganzfried   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Voracity, growth and welfare [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper explores some implications of the comparison between feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for growth and welfare in a `voracity' model. We show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, the Stackelberg equilibrium involves a lower growth ...
Kenji Fujiwara
core  

Beyond Visible Differences: An Experimental Investigation Into the Role of Cognitive Diversity Awareness in Shaping Team Dynamics

open access: yesStrategic Change, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT The relationship between team composition and organizational outcomes is a critical topic in many managerial and business contexts. In this study, we utilize an experimental research method to examine the impact of cognitive diversity on team dynamics.
Jantunen Ari   +5 more
wiley   +1 more source

Non-zero sum differential games of anticipated forward-backward stochastic differential delayed equations under partial information and application

open access: yesAdvances in Difference Equations, 2017
This paper is concerned with a non-zero sum differential game problem of an anticipated forward-backward stochastic differential delayed equation under partial information.
Yi Zhuang
doaj   +1 more source

Smoothing Method for Approximate Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium

open access: yes, 2017
Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree that are not reached in equilibrium.
Farina, Gabriele   +2 more
core   +1 more source

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