RPM and Vertical Integration With Upstream Competition and Noncontractible Efforts
The Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 74, Issue 3, Page 349-366, September 2026.ABSTRACT We study RPM and vertical integration in a common agency setting with two differentiated manufacturers and one retailer, where consumer demand depends on both the manufacturers' and retailer's noncontractible efforts. Under vertical separation, the adoption of maximum RPM by both manufacturers is an equilibrium and intensifies competition ...
Michele Bisceglia +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Including Social Nash Equilibria in Abstract Economies [PDF]
We consider quasi-variational problems (variational problems having constraint sets depending on their own solutions) which appear in concrete economic models such as social and economic networks, financial derivative models, transportation network ...
Jacqueline Morgan, M. Beatrice Lignola
core
Bad NGOs? Competition in the Market for Donations and Workers' Misconduct
The Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 74, Issue 3, Page 367-383, September 2026.ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate how competition among NGOs to attract donations shapes the incentives that NGOs provide to their employees. NGOs hire workers to undertake development projects, which are horizontally and vertically differentiated.
Nadia Burani, Ester Manna
wiley +1 more source
From Nash Equilibrium to Social Optimum and Back: A Mean Field Perspective. [PDF]
Appl Math OptimCarmona R +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games [PDF]
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus,
Indrajit Ray, Susan Snyder
core
Biased News Media and the Swing Voter's Decision in Repeated Games
The Manchester School, Volume 94, Issue 5, Page 469-482, September 2026.ABSTRACT We consider a monopolistic, biased news media platform that attempts to influence the decision of swing voters with cheap talk when voting is costly and abstaining is an option. First, we demonstrate that, while no fully communicative equilibrium exists in a stage game, a partially truth‐revealing mixed‐strategy equilibrium exists.
Jooyong Jun, Jeong‐Yoo Kim
wiley +1 more source
Quantum Cournot Triopoly Game with Heterogeneous Expectations: Dynamics and Chaos Control with Isoelastic Demand. [PDF]
Entropy (Basel)Wei L, Wang S, Wang J.
europepmc +1 more source
Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium [PDF]
We show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents receive signals and condition the choice of strategies on the signals.
Lars Koch
core
Endogenous Institution Formation for Public Good Provision
The Manchester School, Volume 94, Issue 5, Page 497-507, September 2026.ABSTRACT We revisit an existing framework of endogenous institution formation for public good provision, incorporating heterogeneous players to address the question, “Who joins an institution that sanctions only its members to provide a public good?” We analyze two models with different sources of heterogeneity.
Daehong Min, Doojin Ryu
wiley +1 more source
Deception in orbital games: simulation and dissimulation with a maneuverable decoy. [PDF]
Sci RepHan H, Dang Z.
europepmc +1 more source