The Determinants of Negotiated Pharmaceutical Prices
ABSTRACT We focus on the determinants of pharmaceutical drug prices. Using data from the Brazilian pharmaceutical market, we find large variations in drug prices across buyers, drug classes, and time periods. Our estimation results provide evidence that transaction‐specific determinants between buyers and sellers (e.g., transaction volume, buyer's ...
Ralph B. Siebert +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Presumption of Patent Validity and Litigation Incentives
ABSTRACT We analyze the effects of the presumption of patent validity on litigation incentives and outcomes. We develop a litigation game between a patent holder and an alleged infringing firm. A court resolves the dispute if there is a trial. We model the court's decision‐making as a learning process based on evidence and consider the presumption as a
Alice Guerra, Tapas Kundu
wiley +1 more source
From Nash Equilibrium to Social Optimum and Back: A Mean Field Perspective. [PDF]
Carmona R +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Deception in orbital games: simulation and dissimulation with a maneuverable decoy. [PDF]
Han H, Dang Z.
europepmc +1 more source
Anomaly detection using the Nash equilibrium in a multi-agent system : Technical Report IES-2016-03
In order to support operators of surveillance systems and to improve their situation awareness, the automatic detection of unusual behavior and anomalies can provide an essential contribution.
Anneken, Mathias
core
Quantum Negotiation Games: Toward Ethical Equilibria. [PDF]
Smoliński R +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Effect of emotion on hawk-dove game for two players with different strength. [PDF]
Gao Y, Long H, Wang Z, Chen R.
europepmc +1 more source
Research on infrastructure network protection strategy based on bayesian stackelberg game under asymmetric conditions. [PDF]
Zhang J, Gao Y, Kang W, Tian W, Li Y.
europepmc +1 more source
Nash equilibrium of attack and defense behaviors between predators and prey. [PDF]
Ichijo H, Kawamura Y, Nakamura T.
europepmc +1 more source
BARGAINING, VOTING, AND VALUE [PDF]
This paper addresses the following issue: If a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives 'in the shadow' of a voting rule, that is, any agreement can be enforced if a 'winning coalition' supports it, what general agreements are likely to ...
Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano
core

