Results 71 to 80 of about 3,618 (222)

How to play the games? Nash versus Berge behavior rules [PDF]

open access: yes
Social interactions regularly lead to mutually beneficial transactions that are sometimes puzzling. The prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken and trust games prove to be less perplexing than Nash equilibrium predicts.
Rabia Nessah   +2 more
core  

Equilibrium analysis of distributed aggregative game with misinformation [PDF]

open access: yes
summary:This paper considers a distributed aggregative game problem for a group of players with misinformation, where each player has a different perception of the game.
Cheng, Zhaoyang   +5 more
core   +1 more source

Incentive and Signaling Effects of Bonus Payments: An Experiment in a Company

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Economists and management scholars have argued that the scope of incentives to increase cooperation in organizations is limited as their use may signal the prevalence of free‐riding among employees. This paper tests this hypothesis with an artefactual field experiment that assigns managers and employees from a large company to stylized roles ...
Marvin Deversi, Lisa Spantig
wiley   +1 more source

Jugando a la violencia en Colombia: el dilema de pagar o no pagar Playing at violence in Colombia: the dilemma of to play or not to Play

open access: yesCuadernos de Economía, 1996
¿Cuál será el comportamiento de equilibrio de los agentes de más altos ante las amenzas de la subversión a sus vidas y a su patrimonio? En el contexto de un modelo de teoría de juegos, una de las dos estrategias que se discuten, pagar el "contrato de ...
Salazar Boris, Castillo María del Pilar
doaj  

Evidence Gathering Under Competitive and Noncompetitive Rewards

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Reward schemes may affect not only agents' effort but also their incentives to gather information in order to reduce the riskiness of the productive activity. In a laboratory experiment using a novel task, we find that the relationship between incentives and evidence gathering depends critically on the availability of information about peers ...
Philip Brookins   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Remarks on Nash equilibria for games with additively coupled payoffs (revision, previous title: An unusual Nash equilibrium result and its application to games with allocations in infinite dimensions) [PDF]

open access: yes, 1995
If the payoffs of a game are affine, then they are additively coupled. In this situation both the Weierstrass theorem and the Bauer maximum principle can be used to produce existence results for a Nash equilibrium, since each player is faced with an ...
Balder, E.J.
core  

Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the contracts offered by a large healthcare purchaser to health service providers. Contracts are based on the DRG principle that all hospitalizations in a diagnosis group are reimbursed at the same rate. This principle is relaxed in practice, as in several cases, the amount reimbursed within each DRG exhibits ...
Paolo Berta   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Tariffs and Foreign Direct Investment in a Dynamic North–South Model

open access: yesJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper examines how import tariffs by a developed country (the North) and a developing country (the South) affect innovation and foreign direct investment (FDI) using a quality ladder model. We show that a Northern import tariff raises the relative wage of Northern labor, but impedes innovation and FDI. This may worsen Northern welfare. By
TATSURO IWAISAKO, HITOSHI TANAKA
wiley   +1 more source

Nash Bargaining Equilibria for Controllable Markov Chains Games

open access: yes, 2017
A classical bargaining situation involves two individuals who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual bene t. In this paper we present a novel approach for computing the Nash bargaining equilibrium for controllable Markov chains games.
Clempner Kerik, Julio Bernardo   +2 more
core   +1 more source

RPM and Vertical Integration With Upstream Competition and Noncontractible Efforts

open access: yesThe Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study RPM and vertical integration in a common agency setting with two differentiated manufacturers and one retailer, where consumer demand depends on both the manufacturers' and retailer's noncontractible efforts. Under vertical separation, the adoption of maximum RPM by both manufacturers is an equilibrium and intensifies competition ...
Michele Bisceglia   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

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