Results 71 to 80 of about 3,043,182 (218)

Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the contracts offered by a large healthcare purchaser to health service providers. Contracts are based on the DRG principle that all hospitalizations in a diagnosis group are reimbursed at the same rate. This principle is relaxed in practice, as in several cases, the amount reimbursed within each DRG exhibits ...
Paolo Berta   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

The Nash Equilibrium requires strong cooperation [PDF]

open access: yes
Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption.
Rosinger, Elemer Elad
core  

Choosing to Know Less: Strategic Ignorance as a Commitment Device in Vertical Markets with Demand Shocks

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper examines how a retailer's strategic decision to remain uninformed about market demand can influence outcomes in vertical markets. Rather than treating information acquisition as a straightforward cost‐benefit calculation, we show that staying deliberately ignorant may serve as a strategic commitment device that softens upstream ...
Peter Habiger, Michael Kopel
wiley   +1 more source

A Re-Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions [PDF]

open access: yes
We define social institutions as strategies in some repeated game. With this interpretation in mind, we consider the impact of introducing requirements on strategies which have been viewed as necessary properties for any social institution to endure. The
Guilherme Carmona
core  

Financial Constraints, Wages, and Macroeconomic Implications

open access: yesJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper investigates how firm‐level financial constraints affect individual wages and aggregate labor market dynamics during financial recessions. We derive testable predictions from competing theoretical mechanisms and assess them empirically using German administrative worker data matched to firm balance sheets. Embedding these microlevel
HAMZEH ARABZADEH   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Equilibrium Solution in a Game between a Cooperative and its Members [PDF]

open access: yes
In the paper a game-theoretical model is set up to describe the conflict situation in which the members of a marketing cooperative may take advantage of an external market price, higher than that offered by the cooperative.
Antonino Scarelli   +3 more
core  

Make or Buy Decisions and Data Sharing

open access: yesThe Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Firms can share data to discover potential synergies between their data sets and algorithms, eventually leading to more efficient mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. However, data sharing also modifies the competitive balance when firms do not merge, and a company may be reluctant to share data with potential rivals.
Antoine Dubus, Patrick Legros
wiley   +1 more source

Two stage stochastic equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints: modeling and numerical schemes

open access: yes, 2010
This paper presents a two stage stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) model. Some source problems which motivate the model are discussed. Monte Carlo sampling method is applied to solve the SEPEC. Convergence analysis on the
Xu, Huifu, Zhang, Dali
core   +1 more source

Nash Equilibrium and Robust Stability in Dynamic Games: A Small-Gain Perspective [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper develops a novel methodology to study robust stability properties of Nash equilibrium points in dynamic games. Small-gain techniques in modern mathematical control theory are used for the first time to derive conditions guaranteeing uniqueness
Jiang, Zhong-Ping   +2 more
core  

Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts

open access: yesThe Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes optimal licensing contracts when a licensee faces the risk of future infringement claims by unknown patent holders. In a setting where a noncompeting licensor contracts with a monopolistic manufacturer, fixed‐fee licensing is optimal absent such claims.
Jay Pil Choi
wiley   +1 more source

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