Results 81 to 90 of about 2,897,594 (227)

Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the contracts offered by a large healthcare purchaser to health service providers. Contracts are based on the DRG principle that all hospitalizations in a diagnosis group are reimbursed at the same rate. This principle is relaxed in practice, as in several cases, the amount reimbursed within each DRG exhibits ...
Paolo Berta, Gianni De Fraja, Stefano Verzillo   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Game-theoretical approach to minimum entropy productions in information thermodynamics

Physical Review Research
In a situation where each player has control over the transition probabilities of each subsystem, we game-theoretically analyze the optimization problem of minimizing both the partial entropy production of each subsystem and a penalty for failing to ...
Yuma Fujimoto, Sosuke Ito
doaj   +1 more source

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium [PDF]

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility ...
Andreu Mas-Colell, Sergiu Hart
core  

Make or Buy Decisions and Data Sharing

The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Firms can share data to discover potential synergies between their data sets and algorithms, eventually leading to more efficient mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. However, data sharing also modifies the competitive balance when firms do not merge, and a company may be reluctant to share data with potential rivals.
Antoine Dubus, Patrick Legros
wiley   +1 more source

Approximate social nash equilibria and applications [PDF]

In this paper, a concept of approximate social Nash equilibria is considered and an existence result is given when the strategic spaces of the players are not compact. These have been obtained using an approximate fixed point theorem.
Vincenzo Scalzo
core  

Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts

The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes optimal licensing contracts when a licensee faces the risk of future infringement claims by unknown patent holders. In a setting where a noncompeting licensor contracts with a monopolistic manufacturer, fixed‐fee licensing is optimal absent such claims.
Jay Pil Choi
wiley   +1 more source

Subsidy and Pricing Model of Electric Vehicle Sharing Based on Two-Stage Stackelberg Game – A Case Study in China

Applied Sciences, 2019
Electric vehicle sharing provides an effective way to improve the traffic situation and relieve environmental pressure. The government subsidy policy and the car-sharing operator’s pricing strategy are the key factors that affect the large-scale ...
Jun Yang, Yangjia Lin, Fuzhang Wu, Lei Chen   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Strategic Stake Acquisitions in Rival Firms: Common vs. Cross‐Ownership

The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study how a blockholder who controls a firm should acquire a minority stake in a rival: directly, creating common ownership, or indirectly through the controlled firm, creating cross‐ownership. Common ownership generates stronger internalization of competitive externalities and allows the blockholder to capture the resulting gains without ...
Vincenzo Denicolò, Fausto Panunzi
wiley   +1 more source

Nash Equilibrium as an Expression of Self-Referential Reasoning [PDF]

Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents'' rationality (BOR), stating that a player should believe that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential ...
Perea, Andrés
core  

Privatization Under Political Ties

The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT I study a product differentiation model with endogenous entry where a politically connected public firm competes with a private one. Consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay. I argue that—because of political ties—the public firm may mimic the preferences of the consumer with the median willingness to pay.
Matteo Broso
wiley   +1 more source