Results 101 to 110 of about 3,043,182 (218)
Economic Governance and Institutional Design
ABSTRACT How should institutions be designed to achieve compliance with behavioral rules, including laws, social norms, religious rules, or cultural traditions? This conceptual paper introduces a typology of economic governance institutions and explains how it can be used both by policy makers, administrators, and researchers in all social sciences to ...
Jens Prüfer
wiley +1 more source
Three-Stage Dynamic Games of Government-Park-Visitor in Visitor Education Intervention
The government-park-visitor three-stage multiplayers dynamic game G(S1m,S2n,S3k,RG,R,U) is established to solve the significant problem regarding the investment in the visitor education.
Dongping Wei +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Abstract In many environmental problems, emissions are hard to monitor and abatement costs are privately known. We study how efficient abatement nevertheless can be induced through market‐like arrangements that condition transfers on verifiable abatement rather than on measured emissions.
Jens Gudmundsson +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Interdependent‐value auctions with spiteful bidders
Abstract I study the interaction between spiteful preferences and interdependent values in auctions. While spite causes overbidding in both auction formats, interdependent values affect spiteful bidders' incentives differently depending on the auction format.
Matthew J. Robertson
wiley +1 more source
Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium [PDF]
In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility ...
Andreu Mas-Colell, Sergiu Hart
core
Market size and strategic interaction in pharmaceutical price regulation
Abstract We present a model of optimal regulation in the presence of spillover effects and asymmetric countries, and we use it to study strategic interaction among countries in pharmaceutical price regulation, where the spillovers result from innovation in drug development.
Simona Gambaⓡ +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Pure self-confirming equilibrium [PDF]
In a Self-Confirming Equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993A) every player obtains partial information about other players' strategies and plays a best response to some conjecture which is consistent with his information.
Azrieli, Yaron
core
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Signaling Games
Signaling games are characterized by asymmetric information where the more informed player has a choice about what information to provide to its opponent.
Cobb, Barry; Basuchoudhary, Atin; Hartman, Gregory
core +1 more source
Fake Tax Residency and Tax Competition
ABSTRACT Wealthy individuals exploit jurisdictional tax differences through mobility, challenging residence‐based tax systems—particularly via fictitious residency changes. We examine theoretically two countries competing to maximize tax revenues from wealthy individuals while auditing fraudulent residency claims.
Alejandro Esteller‐Moré +1 more
wiley +1 more source
The Analysis of the Behavior of Generators in the Two-Level Market Model of Functioning of the EPS
Electricity market model of interaction between producers (Generation Companies – GC) and System Operator (SO) is considered. We analyze the situation when power producers try to increase their profit distorting their technical parameters.
N. Dresvyanskaya
doaj

