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Cevolutionary instability of mixed Nash solutions [PDF]
Journal of Mathematical Biology, 1983 The authors consider two interacting populations P and Q. The strategy choices of P and Q are indexed by finite sets I and J, respectively. When an i strategist from P meets a j strategist from Q the payoffs are constants \(A_{ij}\), \(B_{ij}\) to the P and Q players, respectively.
I. Eshel, E. Akin
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Recursive Nash-in-Nash Bargaining Solution
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018The standard Nash-in-Nash solution is commonly applied in a number of policy applications. However, this bargaining framework does not capture renegotiation on off-equilibrium paths or contingent contracts and as a result in some situations the predictions of standard Nash-in-Nash are counter-intuitive.
Xiaowei Yu, Keith Waehrer
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The Constrained Nash Bargaining Solution
Journal of the Operational Research Society, 1994Summary: We prove a simple condition which guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the constrained generalized Nash bargaining solution in \(\mathbb{R}^ 2\). Our result is illustrated by a constant elasticity example of firm/union negotiations.
Alexander, C. O., Ledermann, W.
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The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution [PDF]
Econometrica, 2010 The coalitional Nash bargaining solution is defined to be the core allocation for which the product of players' payoffs is maximal. We consider a non-cooperative model with discounting in which one team may form and every player is randomly selected to make a proposal in every period.
Compte, Olivier, Jehiel, Philippe
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Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
Econometrica, 1975A two-person bargaining problem is considered. It is shown that under four axioms that describe the behavior of players there is a unique solution to such a problem. The axioms and the solution presented are different from those suggested by Nash.
Kalai, Ehud, Smorodinsky, Meir
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Beyond Nash Solutions for Differential Graphical Games
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2023zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Victor G. Lopez +3 more
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Theory and Decision, 1991
This paper gives a sufficient condition on a bargaining region \(S\) for the Nash bargaining solution to coincide with the Rawlsian solution (i.e., \(\hbox{Max}_{u\in S}\min(u_ 1,u_ 2))\), where a threat point is assumed to be normalized to \((0,0)\). It is a degeneracy condition, and, of course, is rarely satisfied by a bargaining game.
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This paper gives a sufficient condition on a bargaining region \(S\) for the Nash bargaining solution to coincide with the Rawlsian solution (i.e., \(\hbox{Max}_{u\in S}\min(u_ 1,u_ 2))\), where a threat point is assumed to be normalized to \((0,0)\). It is a degeneracy condition, and, of course, is rarely satisfied by a bargaining game.
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Non-optimal Nash Bargaining Solutions
Economics Letters, 1996zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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The time-preference Nash solution [PDF]
, 2001 We give an axiomatic characterization of the Time-Preference Nash Solution, a bargaining solution that is applied when the underlying preferences are defined over streams of physical outcomes. This bargaining solution is similar to the ordinal Nash solution introduced by Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992), but it gives a different prediction when ...
Nir Dagan, Oscar Volij, Eyal Winter
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Why Nash Solutions are Not Solutions
2001Chapters 5 and 6, with the latter’s appendix, complete the technical background needed to support the constitutional concepts of Chapter 3. Now, as a final technical note, we consider why a number of proposed mechanisms that have precise Lindahl taxes as Nash equilibria cannot deliver the promised outcomes.
Martin J Bailey, Nicolaus Tideman
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