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Veto Players and Non-Cooperative Foundations of Power in Legislative Bargaining
2013In legislative bargaining of the Baron-Ferejohn type, veto players either hold all of the overall power of 1 and share proportional to their recognition probabilities, or hold no power at all. Hence, in this setting, it is impossible to provide non-cooperative support for power indices that do not assign all or no power to veto players. This highlights
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Non-cooperative foundations of hedonic equilibrium [PDF]
This paper studies Bayesian equilibrium in a worker firm matching problem in which workers choose their human capi- tal investment and firms choose wages before the matching process occurs. Symmetric equilibrium exists, and supports assortative matching. However, when the number of traders is large, low types tend to invest too much, while higher types
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An Implementation-theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations
1997Bergin, James +3 more
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