Results 1 to 10 of about 474 (178)

Nonmonotonicity and the scope of reasoning

Artificial Intelligence, 1991
The authors begin by reviewing several apparent incongruities that have been noticed when applying to specific examples the various formalisms of nonmonotonic reasoning, notably circumscription, Reiter default logic and its variants, and autoepistemic logic.
David W. Etherington, Sarit Kraus, Donald Perlis   +2 more
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Nonmonotonic reasoning is sometimes simpler

Journal of Logic and Computation, 1996
Traditional logic is monotonic in the sense that if we deduce a statement \(Q\) from a theory \(T\), and then add a new statement \(S\) to this theory \(T\), then \(Q\) is still deducible from the extended theory \(T + \{S\}\). However, commonsense reasoning is often nonmonotonic: e.g., \(S\) may describe an exception to a general statement from the ...
Grigori Schwarz, Miroslaw Truszczynski
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Nonmonotonic reasoning, nonmonotonic logics and reasoning about change

Artificial Intelligence Review, 1990
In this paper we introduce nonmonotonic reasoning and the attempts at formalizing it using nonmonotonic logics. We examine and compare the best known of these. Despite the difference in motivation and technical construction there are strong similarities between these logics which are confirmed when they are finally shown to have a common basis. Finally
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Coherence and Nonmonotonicity in Human Reasoning

Synthese, 2005
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Niki Pfeifer, Gernot D. Kleiter
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A tutorial on Nonmonotonic Reasoning

1993
Nonmonotonic reasoning, in its broadest sense, is reasoning to conclusions on the basis of incomplete information. Given more information, we are prepared to retract previously drawn inferences. To exhibit the classic example: if all we know about Tweety is that he is bird, then we plausibly conclude that he can fly; on learning that Tweety is a ...
Gerhard Brewka, Jürgen Dix, Kurt Konolige   +2 more
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The Nature of Nonmonotonic Reasoning

Minds and Machines, 2000
Conclusions reached using common sense reasoning from a set of premises are often subsequently revised when additional premises are added. Because we do not always accept previous conclusions in light of subsequent information, common sense reasoning is said to be nonmonotonic.
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Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Databases

1984
A system of nonmonotonic reasoning, called subimplication, has been defined in Bossu and Siegel [1981]. In this chapter we show that it is possible to set up a logical model of databases using subimplication and two sets of stable formulas. This model allows the construction of a system for creating, updating and querying databases that is totally ...
Genevieve Bossu, Pierre Siegel
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Some Strengths of Nonmonotonic Reasoning

2000
A characteristic feature of human reasoning is its ability to draw rational conclusions in situations where not all relevant information is known. In fact, except for the most trivial cases, we always reason with an incomplete body of knowledge describing the current situation we are arguing about. We are constantly forced to make assumptions which may
Uwe Egly, Hans Tompits
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Nonmonotonic reasoning as prioritized argumentation

IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 2001
This paper proposes a formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning based on prioritized argumentation. We argue that nonmonotonic reasoning in general can be viewed as selecting monotonic inferences by a simple notion of priority among inference rules. More importantly, these types of constrained inferences can be specified in a knowledge representation ...
Jia-Huai You, Xianchang Wang, Li-Yan Yuan   +2 more
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Logical foundations of nonmonotonic reasoning

Artificial Intelligence Review, 1991
In this paper we shall review the main approaches to nonmono- tonic reasoning which we classify from the perspective of their underlying logical settings as classical, intuitionistic, three-valuedlpartial models, and conditional. We shall be placing special emphasis on some of the promin- ent approaches.
Nadim Obeid, Raymond Turner
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