Results 271 to 280 of about 601,863 (315)

Optimal Contracts for Teams

International Economic Review, 1991
In a team subject to both adverse selection (each member's ability is known only to himself) and moral hazard (effort cannot be observed), optimal contracts are, under certain conditions, linear in the team's output. The outcome is the same whether the principal observes just the total output or each individual's contribution.
McAfee, R Preston, McMillan, John
openaire   +1 more source

Super-optimization of Smart Contracts

ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology, 2022
Smart contracts are programs deployed on a blockchain. They are executed for a monetary fee paid in gas —a clear optimization target for smart contract compilers. Because smart contracts are a young, fast-moving field without (manually) fine-tuned compilers, they highly benefit from automated and adaptable ...
Elvira Albert   +4 more
openaire   +1 more source

Optimal Sequencing of Contract Algorithms

Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 2003
We address the problem of building an interruptible real-time system using non-interruptible components. Some artificial intelligence techniques offer a tradeoff between computation time and quality of results, but their run-time must be determined when they are activated.
Shlomo Zilberstein   +2 more
openaire   +3 more sources

Optimal Subjective Contracting with Revision

Management Science, 2022
We study the optimal contracting problem with subjective evaluation when the principal can ask the agent to revise his work. The possibility of revision benefits the principal by providing the option value of making another attempt at the work. However, it also introduces a new type of incentive problem for the principal: she may ask for revision even
Xinhao He, Jin Li, Zhaoneng Yuan
openaire   +1 more source

OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTS

Oxford Economic Papers, 1992
This paper investigates the structure of optimal financial contracts and the main factors that influence it--verification and monitoring costs, moral hazard, agents' wealth limitations, and their attitudes to risk. It suggests that the optimality of debt contracts with costly bankruptcy is more robust than some have recently suggested and discusses how
openaire   +1 more source

Optimal Contracts in Portfolio Delegation

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Li, Tao, Zhou, Yuqing
openaire   +2 more sources

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