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Paraconsistent logics?

Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1995
\textit{G. Priest} [``The logic of paradox'', J. Philos. Logic 8, 219-241 (1979; Zbl 0402.03012)] presents a paraconsistent logic, that is, one which does not collapse into all statements being provable but in which nevertheless ``\(A\vee \neg A\)'' is logically true and ``\(A \wedge\neg A\)'' is logically false. But, argues Slater in the present paper,
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Paraconsistent Logic

2002
A logic is paraconsistent if it does not validate the principle that from a pair of contradictory sentences, A and ∼A, everything follows, as most orthodox logics do. If a theory has a paraconsistent underlying logic, it may be inconsistent without being trivial (that is, entailing everything).
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Paraconsistent logics and applications

4th International Workshop on Soft Computing Applications, 2010
In this expository paper we discuss some applications of paraconsistent annotated logics. They have the capability of manipulating concepts like fuzziness, inconsistency, and paracompleteness in a non-trivial manner. Such systems are new and they were discovered recently at the end of last century.
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Bisimilarity for paraconsistent description logics

Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems, 2016
We introduce comparisons w.r.t. information between interpretations in paraconsistent description logics and use them to define bisimilarity for such logics. This notion is useful for concept learning in description logics when inconsistencies occur. We give preservation results and the Hennessy-Milner property for comparisons w.r.t.
Nguyen, Linh Anh   +3 more
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Why Paraconsistent Logics?

2016
In this chapter, we briefly review paraconsistent logics which are closely related to the topics in this book. We give an exposition of their history and formal aspects. We also address the importance of applications of paraconsistent logics to engineering.
Seiki Akama, Newton C. A. da Costa
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Paraconsistent Logic Programs

2002
We propose a framework which extends Antitonic Logic Programs [2] to an arbitrary complete bilattice of truth-values, where belief and doubt are explicitly represented. Based on Fitting's ideas, this framework allows a precise definition of important operators found in logic programming such as explicit negation and the default negation. In particular,
João Alcântara   +2 more
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Paraconsistent Logical Consequence

Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 1998
ABSTRACT The concept of paraconsistent logical consequence is usually negatively defined as a validity semantics in which not every sentences is deducible or in which inferential explosion does not occur. Paraconsistency has been negatively characterized in this way because paraconsistent logics have been designed specifically to avoid the ...
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Logical Weak Completions of Paraconsistent Logics

Journal of Logic and Computation, 2008
Let P be an arbitrary theory and let X be any given logic. Let M be a set of atoms. We say that M is a X-stable model of P if M is a classical model of P and P∪¬M~ proves in logic X all atoms in M, this is denoted by P∪¬M~ ⊩xM. We prove that being an X-stable model is an invariant property for disjunctive programmes under a large class of logics.
M. Osorio Galindo   +2 more
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Modal (Logic) Paraconsistency

2003
According to the standard definition, a logic is said to be paraconsistent if it fails the (so-called) rule of ex falso: i.e., α, ¬α ∀ β. Thus, paraconsistency captures an important sense in which a logic is inconsistency-tolerant, namely when arbitrary inference is prohibited in the presence of inconsistencies.
Philippe Besnard, Paul Wong
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Paraconsistent Classical Logic

2002
But the ambiguity will not trouble us, since the relata will always allow us to tell which relation is meant. We take it for granted that we are dealing with a standard sort of formal language1, and a standard recursive definition of truth-ina-model. Since the details of the language do not matter for our purposes, we will forgo specifying them.
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