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Content, Object, and Phenomenal Character
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2012 The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view.
Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves
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Dreaming, Phenomenal Character, and Acquaintance
, 2019 Abstract Dreams are often defined as sleeping experiences with phenomenal character similar to perceptions of the real world. Hence they pose a prima facie challenge to accounts of phenomenal character in terms of acquaintance relations. One response is disjunctivist: to give a different account of their phenomenal character from that of
T. Stoneham
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Affordances and Phenomenal Character in Spatial Perception
Philosophical Review, The, 2011 According to intentionalism the phenomenal character (“what it’s like”) of a conscious experience is determined wholly by its representational content. In its strongest forms intentionalism offers the tantalizing prospect of a reduction of phenomenal character to representational content. Arguments based on Twin Earth-like scenarios have shown, however,
Prosser Simon
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The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation
Phenomenology and Mind, 2017 In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can
Marta Jorba
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Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character
SynthÈseTomáš Marván +2 more
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How-tests for consciousness and direct neurophenomenal structuralism [PDF]
Frontiers in PsychologyDespite recent criticism, the search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) is still at the core of a contemporary neuroscience of consciousness.
Sascha Benjamin Fink +1 more
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More of me! Less of me!: Reflexive Imperativism about Affective Phenomenal Character
Mind, 2019 Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that ...
Luca Barlassina, Max Khan Hayward
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On Phenomenal Character and Petri Dishes
Journal of Philosophical Research, 2014 Michael Tye (2007) argues that phenomenal character cannot be an intrinsic microphysical property of experiences (or be necessitated by intrinsic microphysical properties) because this would entail that experience could occur in a chunk of tissue in a Petri dish.
G. Bartlett
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Is All Phenomenology Presentational?
Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2022 This paper is about two questions in contemporary philosophy of mind, which I call the Scope Question and the Marks Question. The Scope Question is this: What kinds of mental states (events or processes) have phenomenal character, and how many different ...
Peter V. Forrest
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