Results 11 to 20 of about 99,481 (259)
Dreaming, Phenomenal Character, and Acquaintance
Abstract Dreams are often defined as sleeping experiences with phenomenal character similar to perceptions of the real world. Hence they pose a prima facie challenge to accounts of phenomenal character in terms of acquaintance relations. One response is disjunctivist: to give a different account of their phenomenal character from that of
exaly +6 more sources
Representationalism, skepticism and phenomenal realism
The irreducibility thesis of phenomenal consciousness can only succeed against the sceptical attack and avoid solipsism iff it can coherently establish the transition from subjective certainty to the objectivity of knowledge. The sceptical attack on the
Manas Kumar Sahu
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Novel colours and the content of experience [PDF]
I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida.
Armstrong D. M. +25 more
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Against Phenomenal Externalism
We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal externalism (PE) is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties.
Elisabetta Sacchi, Alberto Voltolini
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Phenomenal Intentionality and the Perception/Cognition Divide [PDF]
One of Brian Loar’s most central contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind is the notion of phenomenal intentionality: a kind of intentional directedness fully grounded in phenomenal character.
Kriegel, Uriah
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perception, self-correction and philosophical intuition [PDF]
. According to the dominant methodology of contemporary analytic philosophy, philosophical intuitions play evidential roles for or against philosophical theories.
Peyman Pourghannad +2 more
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Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures
The phenomenon of ambiguous figures raises difficulties for the theories of the content of our visual experience that hold that its phenomenal character is identical to its representational content and wholly nonconceptual.
Arianna Uggé
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Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap : Defending Physicalism without Phenomenal Concepts [PDF]
The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal concepts.
Fazekas, Péter
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WHAT KINDS OF DISAGREEMENT ARE INTROSPECTIVE DISPUTES? [PDF]
Introspective disputes are introspectively based disputes about features of experiences. This paper addresses the question of what kinds of disagreement are exemplified in such disputes.
Bruno Mölder
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The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons [PDF]
Emotions can be understood generally from two different perspectives: (i) a third-person perspective that specifies their distinctive functional role within our overall cognitive economy and (ii) a first-person perspective that attempts to capture their ...
Kriegel, Uriah, Timmons, Mark
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