Results 21 to 30 of about 99,481 (259)

In Defence of Phenomenal Disjunctivism: An Elucidation

Phenomenology and Mind, 2016
The aim of the present paper is to provide an elucidation of the commitments and motivations of phenomenal disjunctivism. Such an elucidation is very much needed, for, as far as I can see, the view, originally introduced by M.G.F.
Roberta Locatelli
doaj   +1 more source

The Auditory Field: The Spatial Character of Auditory Experience

Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2023
It is widely accepted that there is a visual field, but the analogous notion of an auditory field is rejected by many philosophers on the grounds that the metaphysics or phenomenology of audition lack the necessary spatial structure.
Keith A. Wilson
doaj   +2 more sources

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents [PDF]

, 2017
In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents.
Jorba, Marta, Vicente, Agustín
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Visual Acquaintance, Action & The Explanatory Gap [PDF]

, 2021
Much attention has recently been paid to the idea, which I label ‘External World Acquaintance’ (EWA), that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is partially constituted by external features.
Raleigh, Thomas
core  

Subjective Facts about Consciousness

Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2023
The starting point of this paper is the thought that the phenomenal appearances that accompany mental states are somehow only there, or only real, from the standpoint of the subject of those mental states.
Martin A. Lipman
doaj   +2 more sources

Ambiguous figures and the content of experience [PDF]

, 2006
Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual.
Attneave F, Bermudez J. L, Block N, Byrne A, Chalmers D. J, Crane T, Cussins A, Davidson D, Davidson D, Davies M, Dretske F. I, Dretske F. I, Ferrante D., Fiona Macpherson, Goldstein E. B, Gregory R. L, Gregory R. L, Haber R. N, Hochberg J., Mach E, Macpherson F, Macpherson F, Martin M. G. F, McDowell J, McDowell J, McGinn C, Millar A, Millikan R. G, Nagel T, Palmer S. E, Palmer S. E, Peacocke C, Peacocke C, Peacocke C, Peacocke C, Raffman D, Rock I, Schaffer J, Siewert C. P, Slater A., Smith A. D, Strawson G, Strawson P. F, Tye M, Tye M, Wiser M, Yarbus A. L   +46 more
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Intentionalism and pain [PDF]

, 2003
Pain may appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory.
Bain, D.T.
core   +3 more sources

Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self [PDF]

, 2019
It is generally agreed that consciousness is a somewhat slippery term. However, more narrowly defined as 'phenomenal consciousness' it captures at least three essential features or aspects: subjective experience (the notion that what we are primarily ...
Coseru, Christian
core   +1 more source

X-The agential profile of perceptual experience [PDF]

, 2010
Reflection on cases involving the occurrence of various types of perceptual activity suggests that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be partly determined by agential factors.
Crowther, Thomas
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Perception, introspective indiscriminability and the common factor principle

Filosofia Unisinos, 2011
Conjunctive philosophical theories of visual experience accept the common kind principle, according to which perceptions and their introspectively indiscriminable hallucinatory counterparts should be considered as mental states or events of the same ...
Francisco Pereira
doaj   +1 more source