Results 11 to 20 of about 1,592,640 (285)
Dreaming, Phenomenal Character, and Acquaintance
, 2019 Abstract Dreams are often defined as sleeping experiences with phenomenal character similar to perceptions of the real world. Hence they pose a prima facie challenge to accounts of phenomenal character in terms of acquaintance relations. One response is disjunctivist: to give a different account of their phenomenal character from that of
T. Stoneham
semanticscholar +5 more sources
The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation
Phenomenology and Mind, 2017 In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can
Marta Jorba
doaj +2 more sources
Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality? [PDF]
, 2016 The so-called transparency of experience (TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects.
Bordini, Davide
core +3 more sources
Phenomenal Intentionality and the Perception/Cognition Divide [PDF]
, 2019 One of Brian Loar’s most central contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind is the notion of phenomenal intentionality: a kind of intentional directedness fully grounded in phenomenal character.
Kriegel, Uriah
core +2 more sources
Against Phenomenal Externalism
Crítica, 2018 We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal externalism (PE) is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties.
Elisabetta Sacchi, Alberto Voltolini
doaj +1 more source
Novel colours and the content of experience [PDF]
, 2003 I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida.
Armstrong D. M. +25 more
core +2 more sources
perception, self-correction and philosophical intuition [PDF]
Metaphysics, 2016 . According to the dominant methodology of contemporary analytic philosophy, philosophical intuitions play evidential roles for or against philosophical theories.
Peyman Pourghannad +2 more
doaj +1 more source
The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons [PDF]
, 2021 Emotions can be understood generally from two different perspectives: (i) a third-person perspective that specifies their distinctive functional role within our overall cognitive economy and (ii) a first-person perspective that attempts to capture their ...
Kriegel, Uriah, Timmons, Mark
core
Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures
Phenomenology and Mind, 2016 The phenomenon of ambiguous figures raises difficulties for the theories of the content of our visual experience that hold that its phenomenal character is identical to its representational content and wholly nonconceptual.
Arianna Uggé
doaj +1 more source