Results 211 to 220 of about 1,592,640 (285)
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The fragmentation of phenomenal character

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2021
AbstractIn this paper, I argue that debates over “phenomenal character” have suffered from fragmentation: philosophers who use the term have had in mind at least three (and probably more) radically different kinds of properties. This has occurred because the expression “what it’s like” exhibits a particularly deep form of context‐sensitivity, and when ...
Neil Mehta
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Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character

Erkenntnis, 2018
I argue that intentionalist theories of perceptual experience are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I begin by describing what is involved in explaining phenomenal character, and why it is a task of philosophical theories of perceptual experience to explain it.
Harold Langsam
semanticscholar   +3 more sources

On Phenomenal Character and Petri Dishes

open access: yesJournal of Philosophical Research, 2014
Michael Tye (2007) argues that phenomenal character cannot be an intrinsic microphysical property of experiences (or be necessitated by intrinsic microphysical properties) because this would entail that experience could occur in a chunk of tissue in a Petri dish.
G. Bartlett
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Phenomenal Character Revisited

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2000
I am grateful to Michael Tye for his discussion of my book, and to the editor for offering me the opportunity to respond to Tye's criticisms of my account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience-especially since this prompted reflections that led me to see a way of removing one unattractive feature of the account.
S. Shoemaker
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Subjective Character as the Origo a Quo of Phenomenal Consciousness

Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2021
Abstract This article contributes to the debate on self-consciousness, inner awareness, and subjective character. Philosophers puzzle over whether subjective character has a monadic or a relational form. But the present article deploys formal ontology to show that this is a false dichotomy.
Kyle Banick
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Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism

Philosophical Studies, 2008
A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible.
J. Ellis
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Affordances and Phenomenal Character in Spatial Perception

open access: yesPhilosophical Review, 2011
According to intentionalism the phenomenal character (“what it’s like”) of a conscious experience is determined wholly by its representational content. In its strongest forms intentionalism offers the tantalizing prospect of a reduction of phenomenal character to representational content. Arguments based on Twin Earth-like scenarios have shown, however,
Simon Prosser
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ASPECT-SWITCHING AND VISUAL PHENOMENAL CHARACTER

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2009
John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect-switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I respond that cases of aspect-switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties.
Richard N. Price
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Reduction and the determination of phenomenal character

Philosophical Psychology, 2011
A central task of philosophy of mind in recent decades has been to come up with a comprehensive account of the mind that is consistent with materialism. To this end, philosophers have offered useful reductive accounts of mentality in terms that are ultimately explainable by neurobiology.
Jennifer Matey
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