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Do Phenomenal Concepts Misrepresent? [PDF]
Philosophical Psychology, 2016 AbstractMany contemporary physicalists concede to dualists that conscious subjects have distinctive “phenomenal concepts” of the phenomenal qualities of their experiences. Indeed, they contend that idiosyncratic characteristics of these concepts facilitate responses to influential anti-physicalist arguments.
Darragh Byrne
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2007
AbstractThis chapter presents a version of the phenomenal concept strategy based on a limited defense of the “demonstrative account” of phenomenal concepts. In this account, phenomenal concepts pick out their referents directly, much like demonstratives, without mediation by any mode of presentation.
Janet Levin
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AbstractThis chapter presents a version of the phenomenal concept strategy based on a limited defense of the “demonstrative account” of phenomenal concepts. In this account, phenomenal concepts pick out their referents directly, much like demonstratives, without mediation by any mode of presentation.
Janet Levin
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Philosophy Compass, 2011
Abstract It’s a common idea in philosophy that we possess concepts of a peculiar kind by which we can think about our conscious states in ‘inner’ and ‘direct’ ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such.
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Abstract It’s a common idea in philosophy that we possess concepts of a peculiar kind by which we can think about our conscious states in ‘inner’ and ‘direct’ ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such.
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Phenomenal Concepts in Mindreading
Philosophical Psychology, 2009In an earlier paper (Biggs, 2007) I argue that those attributing mental states sometimes simulate the phenomenal states of those to whom they are making attributions (i.e., targets). In this paper I argue that such phenomenal simulation plays an important role in some third-person mental state attributions. More specifically, I identity three important
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Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism
Philosophical Studies, 2008A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible.
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Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint
2007AbstractThis chapter raises a problem for the phenomenal concept strategy. The problem is framed partly in terms of the explanatory gap, which is roughly the claim that the existence or nature of phenomenal consciousness cannot be completely explained in physical terms.
Joseph Levine
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2002
AbstractExplores the structure of phenomenal concepts. It examines how far they are expressed by everyday words, compares them to perceptual concepts, develops a quotational model of their workings, considers how far they give rise to incorrigible judgements, and discusses whether they violate Wittgenstein's “private language argument”.
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AbstractExplores the structure of phenomenal concepts. It examines how far they are expressed by everyday words, compares them to perceptual concepts, develops a quotational model of their workings, considers how far they give rise to incorrigible judgements, and discusses whether they violate Wittgenstein's “private language argument”.
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts
Philosophical Studies, 2012Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special ...
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A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2003There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts (Loar, 1990; Lycan ...
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