Results 171 to 180 of about 3,955,858 (227)

Phenomenal Concepts: Phenomenal Concepts

Philosophy Compass, 2011
Abstract It’s a common idea in philosophy that we possess concepts of a peculiar kind by which we can think about our conscious states in ‘inner’ and ‘direct’ ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such.
P. Sundström
semanticscholar   +2 more sources

“Phenomenal States” and the Scope of the Phenomenal Concepts Strategy

Sensations, Thoughts, Language, 2019
Brian Loar, in “Phenomenal States”, presents a compelling account of how bodily sensations and perceptual experiences could be identical with physical properties, while explaining why dualism may nonetheless exert an intuitive pull. However, while many physicalists embrace this account—now commonly called the “Phenomenal Concepts Strategy”—anti ...
J. Levin
semanticscholar   +2 more sources

Phenomenal Concepts

2009
I explore various claims about the nature of phenomenal concepts and isolate two recurring intuitions. The first involves the epistemological role of phenomenal concepts: a phenomenal concept is supposed to be a concept of a type of experience that must be possessed by a subject who knows what it is like to have an experience of the type in question ...
  +4 more sources

In Defense of Phenomenal Concepts

Philosophical Papers, 2012
Abstract In recent debates, both physicalist and anti-physicalist philosophers of mind have come to agree that understanding the nature of phenomenal concepts is key to understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness itself. Recently, however, Derek Ball (2009) and Michael Tye (2009) have argued that there are no such concepts.
B. Veillet
semanticscholar   +2 more sources

Natural Concepts, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Conceivability Argument

Erkenntnis, 2013
The conceivability argument against materialism, originally raised by Saul Kripke and then reformulated, among others, by David Chalmers holds that we can conceive of the distinctness of a phenomenal state and its neural realiser, or, in Chalmers’ variation of the argument, a zombie world.
Jussi Jylkkä
semanticscholar   +2 more sources

Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge

2007
Abstract What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This book discusses these topics. All chapters focus on consciousness in the “phenomenal” sense: looking at what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that
Torin Alter, Sven Walter
openaire   +1 more source

Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism

Philosophical Studies, 2008
A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible.
openaire   +1 more source

Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts

Philosophical Psychology, 2011
S. Wilkinson
semanticscholar   +2 more sources

Phenomenal Concepts

2002
AbstractExplores the structure of phenomenal concepts. It examines how far they are expressed by everyday words, compares them to perceptual concepts, develops a quotational model of their workings, considers how far they give rise to incorrigible judgements, and discusses whether they violate Wittgenstein's “private language argument”.
openaire   +1 more source

Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2005
Over the past decade or so, David Papineau has given an account of the content and motivation of a physicalist conception of the world with more thoroughness and argumentative defence than many physicalists have thought necessary. In doing this, he has substantially advanced the debate on physicalism, and physicalists and non-physicalists alike should ...
openaire   +1 more source