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On ‘Defending The Phenomenal Concept Strategy’
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2009I argue that Diaz-Leon fails to defend the phenomenal concept strategy against Stoljar's criticism because she fails to give us any general reasons for thinking that conditionals that involve psychologically distinct concepts could be a priori.
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Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2008One of the main strategies against conceivability arguments is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which aims to explain the epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths in terms of the special features of phenomenal concepts. Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that the phenomenal concept strategy has failed to provide a successful ...
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Russellian Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and Revelation
Philosophia (United States), 2023Christopher Devlin Brown
exaly
The individuation of phenomenal concepts
2014Nel suo contributo dedicato al contrasto tra dualisti e fi sicalisti sulla natura dei qualia Luca Malatesti si sofferma sulla cosiddetta strategia del concetto fenomenico adottata da alcuni fi sicalisti, secondo cui le intuizioni usate negli argomenti contro il fisicalismo sono basate su alcune illusioni cognitive generate dai concetti fenomenici, che ...
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Phenomenal Concepts and Mental Files: Phenomenal Concepts are theory-based
Philosophia Naturalis, 2011openaire +1 more source
Powerful Qualities, Phenomenal Concepts, and the New Challenge to Physicalism
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2018Henry Taylor
exaly
The Knowledge argument and phenomenal concepts
2012There is widespread debate in contemporary philosophy of mind over the place of conscious experiences in the natural world – where the latter is taken to be broadly as described and explained by such sciences as physics, chemistry and biology. Conscious experiences encompass pains, bodily sensations, perceptions, feelings and moods.
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Using Phenomenal Concepts to Explain Away the Intuition of Contingency
Philosophical Psychology, 2014Nicholas Shea
exaly

