Results 181 to 190 of about 2,969 (214)
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2006
AbstractThe question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, the author identifies the topic: events of experience whose defining characteristic is that there is something it is like to undergo them ...
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AbstractThe question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, the author identifies the topic: events of experience whose defining characteristic is that there is something it is like to undergo them ...
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“Phenomenal States” and the Scope of the Phenomenal Concepts Strategy
2019Brian Loar, in “Phenomenal States”, presents a compelling account of how bodily sensations and perceptual experiences could be identical with physical properties, while explaining why dualism may nonetheless exert an intuitive pull. However, while many physicalists embrace this account—now commonly called the “Phenomenal Concepts Strategy”—anti ...
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In Defense of Phenomenal Concepts
Philosophical Papers, 2012Abstract In recent debates, both physicalist and anti-physicalist philosophers of mind have come to agree that understanding the nature of phenomenal concepts is key to understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness itself. Recently, however, Derek Ball (2009) and Michael Tye (2009) have argued that there are no such concepts.
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Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2005Over the past decade or so, David Papineau has given an account of the content and motivation of a physicalist conception of the world with more thoroughness and argumentative defence than many physicalists have thought necessary. In doing this, he has substantially advanced the debate on physicalism, and physicalists and non-physicalists alike should ...
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Are Phenomenal Concepts Perspectival?
Southwest Philosophy Review, 20121. Are phenomenal concepts perspectival? That is to say, is it the case that a subject can possess or acquire a phenomenal concept only if the subject has previously experienced that to which the concept refers? In this essay, I have a two-fold objective.
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Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception
Philosophy Compass, 2008Abstract The concept of evidence is among the central concerns of epistemology broadly construed. As such, it has long engaged the intellectual energies of both philosophers of science and epistemologists of a more traditional variety.
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Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2004Relying on a range of now‐familiar thought‐experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. (Phenomenal consciousness is a form of state‐consciousness, which contrasts with creature‐consciousness, orperceptual ‐consciousness.The different forms of state‐consciousness include ...
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The Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts
2023Abstract This chapter discusses the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts, on which phenomenal concepts refer to non-physical properties if such properties exist and otherwise to physical properties. Hawthorne, Braddon-Mitchell, and Stalnaker argue that the conditional analysis enables physicalists to reconcile the intuitions ...
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Phenomenal Belief, Phenomenal Concepts, and Phenomenal Properties in a Two-Dimensional Framework
2006Abstract Peter, who is looking at the cloudless sky during the day, and Eve, who is looking at a painting of Yves Klein, have something in common. They both have a visual experience that has a common feature with respect to the color sensation. They are both having a blue sensation.
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