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Phenomenal concepts in mindreading
Philosophical Psychology, 2009In an earlier paper (Biggs, 2007) I argue that those attributing mental states sometimes simulate the phenomenal states of those to whom they are making attributions (i.e., targets). In this paper I argue that such phenomenal simulation plays an important role in some third-person mental state attributions. More specifically, I identity three important
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Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2004Relying on a range of now‐familiar thought‐experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. (Phenomenal consciousness is a form of state‐consciousness, which contrasts with creature‐consciousness, orperceptual ‐consciousness.The different forms of state‐consciousness include ...
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2006
AbstractThe question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, the author identifies the topic: events of experience whose defining characteristic is that there is something it is like to undergo them ...
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AbstractThe question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, the author identifies the topic: events of experience whose defining characteristic is that there is something it is like to undergo them ...
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Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception
Philosophy Compass, 2008Abstract The concept of evidence is among the central concerns of epistemology broadly construed. As such, it has long engaged the intellectual energies of both philosophers of science and epistemologists of a more traditional variety.
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A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2003There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts (Loar, 1990; Lycan ...
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Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2008One of the main strategies against conceivability arguments is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which aims to explain the epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths in terms of the special features of phenomenal concepts. Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that the phenomenal concept strategy has failed to provide a successful ...
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Phenomenal Belief, Phenomenal Concepts, and Phenomenal Properties in a Two-Dimensional Framework
2006Abstract Peter, who is looking at the cloudless sky during the day, and Eve, who is looking at a painting of Yves Klein, have something in common. They both have a visual experience that has a common feature with respect to the color sensation. They are both having a blue sensation.
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2007
AbstractThis chapter presents a version of the phenomenal concept strategy based on a limited defense of the “demonstrative account” of phenomenal concepts. In this account, phenomenal concepts pick out their referents directly, much like demonstratives, without mediation by any mode of presentation.
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AbstractThis chapter presents a version of the phenomenal concept strategy based on a limited defense of the “demonstrative account” of phenomenal concepts. In this account, phenomenal concepts pick out their referents directly, much like demonstratives, without mediation by any mode of presentation.
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The Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts
2023Abstract This chapter discusses the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts, on which phenomenal concepts refer to non-physical properties if such properties exist and otherwise to physical properties. Hawthorne, Braddon-Mitchell, and Stalnaker argue that the conditional analysis enables physicalists to reconcile the intuitions ...
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