Results 31 to 40 of about 4,508,703 (295)
Do We Really Exist? Eastern Inspirations in Thomas Metzinger’s Self-model Theory of Subjectivity
This paper is an analysis of Thomas Metzinger’s self-model theory of subjectivity (SMT). Metzinger claims that beyond the biological organism and its properties, there is no individual and distinct ...
Wojciech Kościuczyk
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Here, we report a breakthrough study in catalytic alkene isomerisation using crown ether‐supported alkali metal phosphides in which the activity increases sequentially and significantly as Group One is descended with Cs(18‐crown‐6)PPh2 (1Cs) performing best.
Felix Krämer +2 more
wiley +2 more sources
What Acquaintance Teaches [PDF]
In her black and white room, Mary doesn’t know what it is like to see red. Only after undergoing an experience as of something red and hence acquainting herself with red can Mary learn what it is like.
Grzankowski, Alex, Tye, Michael
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Although phenomenal consciousness resists explanation in physical terms, it remains an open question whether or not consciousness is an intrinsically physical phenomenon since it remains an open question whether or not conscious states are identical with
Karol Polcyn
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A posteriori physicalism and phenomenal concepts: The a priori synthesizable objection
The aim of this paper is to critically assess and respond to two objections advanced by Daniel Stoljar (2005) against the so-called phenomenal concept strategy.
Julia Telles de Menezes
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Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism [PDF]
Few these days dispute that the knowledge argument demonstrates an epistemic gap between the physical facts and the facts about experience. It is much more contentious whether that epistemic gap can be used to demonstrate a metaphysical gap of a kind ...
Al-Ghazālī. +209 more
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Luka eksplanacyjna a pojęcia własności fenomenalnych stanowisko Josepha Levine’a ( Explanatory gap and the concept of phenomenal properties: Joseph Levine’s view) [PDF]
The explanatory gap problem arises in the context of the mind-body relation, and especially the phenomenal concepts-physical concepts relation. It is posed as a question about the method which is appropriate for the reduction of consciousness to physical
Adriana Schetz
doaj
Phenomenal Intentionality and the Perception/Cognition Divide [PDF]
One of Brian Loar’s most central contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind is the notion of phenomenal intentionality: a kind of intentional directedness fully grounded in phenomenal character.
Kriegel, Uriah
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Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality? [PDF]
The so-called transparency of experience (TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects.
Bordini, Davide
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On what we experience when we hear people speak [PDF]
According to perceptualism, fluent comprehension of speech is a perceptual achievement, in as much as it is akin to such high-level perceptual states as the perception of objects as cups or trees, or of people as happy or sad.
Nes, Anders
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