Results 111 to 120 of about 69,347 (254)

Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
This paper asks whether phenomenal intentionality (intentionality that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone) has a relational structure of the sort envisaged in Russell’s theory of acquaintance.
Bourget, David
core  

Contingent Grounding Physicalism

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT It is widely held that physicalism is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of zombies, i.e., beings physically just like us yet lacking in phenomenal consciousness. The present paper argues that this orthodoxy is mistaken. As against the received wisdom, physicalism is perfectly compatible with the possibility of zombies and zombie ...
Alex Moran
wiley   +1 more source

In Defence of Phenomenal Disjunctivism: An Elucidation

open access: yesPhenomenology and Mind, 2016
The aim of the present paper is to provide an elucidation of the commitments and motivations of phenomenal disjunctivism. Such an elucidation is very much needed, for, as far as I can see, the view, originally introduced by M.G.F.
Roberta Locatelli
doaj   +1 more source

‘What it is Like’ Talk is not Technical Talk [PDF]

open access: yes, 2016
‘What it is like’ talk (‘WIL-talk’) — the use of phrases such as ‘what it is like’ — is ubiquitous in discussions of phenomenal consciousness. It is used to define, make claims about, and to offer arguments concerning consciousness.
Farrell, Jonathan
core  

The Concept of Categoricity

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Despite the fact that the concept of categoricity is ubiquitous in contemporary metaphysics, it is hard to find a suitable characterization of categoricity. I hold that the absence of such a characterization is responsible for much confusion and debate regarding categorical properties and their relationship to dispositions.
Sungho Choi
wiley   +1 more source

The hidden structure of consciousness

open access: yesFrontiers in Psychology
According to Loorits, if we want consciousness to be explained in terms of natural sciences, we should be able to analyze its seemingly non-structural aspects, like qualia, in structural terms.
Bruno Forti
doaj   +1 more source

Double bookkeeping and schizophrenia spectrum: divided unified phenomenal consciousness. [PDF]

open access: yesEur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci, 2021
Parnas J, Urfer-Parnas A, Stephensen H.
europepmc   +1 more source

Dogmatism and Easy Knowledge: Avoiding the Dialectic?

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes and objects to the anti‐skeptical strategy endorsed by Epistemological Dogmatism. Dogmatism is a theory of epistemic justification that holds perceptual warrant for our beliefs is immediate, based on experiential seemings. Crucially, it rejects requests for higher‐order justification or active defense of the justification ...
Guido Tana
wiley   +1 more source

Świadomość fenomenalna a problem intencjonalności. O intencjonalności fenomalnej (Phenomenal Consciousness and the Problem of Intentionality. About Phenomenal Intentionality) [PDF]

open access: yesAnaliza i Egzystencja, 2011
The article concerns the problem of how to understand the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality or mental content – an issue that, until recently, has been neglected by many analytic philosophers of mind. I distinguish two ways
Paweł Gładziejewski
doaj  

Theory of Sense‐Data

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT I develop and defend a sense‐datum theory of perception. My theory follows the spirit of classic sense‐datum theories: I argue that what it is to have a perceptual experience is to be acquainted with some sense‐data, where sense‐data are private particulars that have all the properties they appear to have, that are common to both perception ...
Andrew Y. Lee
wiley   +1 more source

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