Results 171 to 180 of about 2,724 (208)
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2000
How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious.
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How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious.
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Binding and the Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness
Consciousness and Cognition, 1999The binding problem is frequently discussed in consciousness research. However, it is by no means clear what the problem is supposed to be and how exactly it relates to consciousness. In the present paper the nature of the binding problem is clarified by distinguishing between different formulations of the problem.
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2010
How can the fine-grained phenomenology of conscious experience arise from neural processes in the brain? How does a set of action potentials (nerve impulses) become like the feeling of pain in ones experience? Contemporary neuroscience is teaching us that our mental states correlate with neural processes in the brain.
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How can the fine-grained phenomenology of conscious experience arise from neural processes in the brain? How does a set of action potentials (nerve impulses) become like the feeling of pain in ones experience? Contemporary neuroscience is teaching us that our mental states correlate with neural processes in the brain.
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The structure of phenomenal consciousness
2015Philosophers have largely abandoned the claim that the special sciences will ultimately reduce to microphysics in favour of the view that the special sciences trade in functional explanations. However, a careful examination of scientific practice reveals that the explanatory strategy of the special sciences is neither reductionist nor functionalist ...
Opie, J., O'Brien, G.
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Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness
2004William S. Robinson has for many years written insightfully about the mind-body problem. In Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness he focuses on sensory experience (e.g., pain, afterimages) and perception qualities such as colours, sounds and odours to present a dualistic view of the mind, called Qualitative Event Realism, that goes against the ...
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Hallucinations and Phenomenal Consciousness
2019This chapter examines whether hallucinations are related to the problem of phenomenal consciousness and how historical contributions to the phenomenology of hallucinations, notably the Early Heidelberg School (1909–1932), shed light on hallucinations in schizophrenia.
Aaron Mishara, Yuliya Zaytseva
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Triangulating phenomenal consciousness
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1995AbstractThis commentary offers two criticisms of Block's account of phenomenal consciousness and a brief sketch of a rival account. The negative points are that monitoring consciousness also involves the possession of certain states and that phenomenal consciousness inevitably involves some sort of monitoring. My positive suggestion is that “phenomenal
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Hill on phenomenal consciousness
Philosophical Studies, 2015I argue that it is at least open to a proponent of type materialism for phenomenal consciousness to accept Hill’s representational theory of experiential awareness of perceptual qualia.
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Leibniz on Phenomenal Consciousness
Vivarium, 2014The main aim of this paper is to show that we can extract an elaborate account of phenomenal consciousness from Leibniz’s (1646-1716) writings. Against a prevalent view, which attributes a higher-order reflection account of phenomenal consciousness to Leibniz, it is argued that we should understand Leibniz as holding a first-order conception of it.
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The Phenomenal Character of Consciousness
Abstract This chapter focuses on phenomenal consciousness. The starting assumption is Nagel’s observation that consciousness, in particular the phenomenal appearances that accompany conscious mental states, are only there from the perspective of the relevant subject and are somehow involved in the subject’s being a perspective on the ...openaire +1 more source