Results 71 to 80 of about 69,347 (254)

Consciousness, Naturalism, and Human Flourishing [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
This chapter pursues the question of naturalism in the context of non-Western philosophical contributions to ethics and philosophy of mind: First, what conception of naturalism, if any, is best suited to capture the scope of Buddhist Reductionism? Second,
Coseru, Christian
core   +1 more source

Seeing Others as Objects: Perceptual Objectification & Affordances

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract In discussions of objectification, the use of visual language is ubiquitous. It is striking that the literature often talks about treating and seeing someone as an object in the same breath. Yet accounts of objectification focus on objectifying treatment and leave the notion of objectifying perception unexplained.
Paulina Sliwa, Tom McClelland
wiley   +1 more source

On Schopenhauer's Debt to Spinoza1

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract Schopenhauer offers ‘nature is not divine but demonic’ as a direct rebuttal of Spinoza's pantheism, his identification of ‘nature’ with ‘God’. And so, one would think, he ought to have been immune to the ‘Spinozism’ that became, as Heine called it, ‘the unofficial religion’ of the age.
Julian Young
wiley   +1 more source

Phenomenal Knowledge without Phenomenal Concepts? On Jesse Prinz’ Theory of Mental Pointers

open access: yesRevista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento, 2011
The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the “knowledge argument” proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz’ proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive ...
Barberis, Sergio Daniel
doaj  

WHERE EXPERIENCES ARE: DUALIST, PHYSICALIST, ENACTIVE AND REFLEXIVE ACCOUNTS OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS [PDF]

open access: yes, 2006
Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-reductive’ physicalists (biological naturalists) believe that experiences are really in the brain, producing an apparent impasse in current theories of mind ...
Velmans, Prof Max
core  

Perspectives on Time and Personality: Philip G. Zimbardo (1934–2024) in Memoriam

open access: yesJournal of Personality, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT The present paper aims to honor the memory of one of the most notable figures in psychological science over the past five decades, Philip G. Zimbardo, who sadly passed away in late 2024. To this end, we provide a multi‐perspective view on psychological time—a topic that deeply engaged Phil Zimbardo during the later stages of his prolific ...
Maciej Stolarski   +7 more
wiley   +1 more source

Visual Perspectives in Episodic Memory and the Sense of Self

open access: yesFrontiers in Psychology, 2018
The connection between memory and self-consciousness has been a central topic in philosophy of memory. When remembering an event we experienced in the past, not only do we experience being the subject of the conscious episode, but we also experience ...
Ying-Tung Lin
doaj   +1 more source

Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities.
Schellenberg, Susanna
core  

Kant on Bullshit Jobs—Mere Means and True Means

open access: yesJournal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Following David Graeber's Bullshit Jobs, there has recently been academic and public discussion about useless work. Immanuel Kant maintains that we ought to be means for others and that there is a duty to be useful. Graeber and Kant are both concerned with a form of harm often overlooked in contemporary ethics and political philosophy, namely,
Martin Sticker
wiley   +1 more source

Is the Mind a Magic Trick? Illusionism about Consciousness in the “Consciousness-Only” Theory of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati

open access: yesErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
Illusionists about consciousness boldly argue that phenomenal consciousness does not fundamentally exist—it only seems to exist. For them, the impression of having a private inner life of conscious qualia is nothing more than a cognitive error, a ...
Amit Chaturvedi
doaj   +2 more sources

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