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THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT AGAINST MATERIALISM AND THE STRATEGY OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS

Filosofska dumka (Philosophical Thought), 2023
Materialism/physicalism that generally dominates in the contemporary analytic philosophy is challenged by fairly powerful anti-materialist arguments, notably the zombie argument (most influentially defended by David Chalmers) and the knowledge argument (the most widely discussed version of which was advanced and defended by Frank Jackson).
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Self‐Knowledge and Phenomenal Unity

Noûs, 2001
How do you know what you’re currently experiencing? How do you know that you feel pain when you do, or that something looks purple or round to you when it does? The question needs interpretation—but it is intelligible. And apparently, it’s not inconsequential: knowledge of one’s own experience seems to play an important and pervasive part in knowledge ...
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Receptivity and Phenomenal Self-Knowledge

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2013
In this article, I argue that an epistemic question about knowledge of our own phenomenal states encourages a certain metaphysical picture of consciousness according to which phenomenal states are reflexive mental representations. Section 1 describes and motivates the thesis that phenomenal self-knowledge is ‘receptive’: that is, the view that a ...
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New Phenomenalism as an Account of Perceptual Knowledge

Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, 1975
To be an Empiricist with respect to knowledge of the natural world, is to insist that all knowledge of that world is rooted in perceptual experience. All claims which go beyond the deliverances of the senses must, in the end, be justified by, and understood in terms of, relations holding between those claims and sensory data.
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Seemings, Reasons, and Knowledge: A Defense of Phenomenal Conservatism

2018
Most objections to evidentialism flounder upon a bad theory of evidence. It is very common for self-styled anti-evidentialists to assume a narrow theory of evidence and then proceed to show how evidentialism—on that theory of evidence—has this or that negative consequence. This doesn’t mean that evidentialism is in the clear though.
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Unconscious motivation and phenomenal knowledge: Toward a comprehensive theory of implicit mental states

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1999
A comprehensive theory of implicit and explicit knowledge must explain phenomenal knowledge (e.g., knowledge regarding one's affective and motivational states), as well as propositional (i.e., “fact”-based) knowledge. Findings from several research areas (i.e., the subliminal mere exposure effect, artificial grammar learning, implicit and self ...
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The Knowledge Expressed by Phenomenal Avowals

Abstract Phenomenal avowals—self-ascriptions of states of consciousness like ‘I have a headache’, ‘I feel weary’, ‘I feel anxious’, ‘I have ringing in my ears’, ‘I have a bitter taste in my mouth’—are standardly regarded, at least when sincere and conceptually competent, as authoritative.
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The Knowledge argument and phenomenal concepts

2012
There is widespread debate in contemporary philosophy of mind over the place of conscious experiences in the natural world – where the latter is taken to be broadly as described and explained by such sciences as physics, chemistry and biology. Conscious experiences encompass pains, bodily sensations, perceptions, feelings and moods.
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Self-knowledge and “inner sense.” Lecture III: The phenomenal character of experience

1996
These lectures have been organized around the question of whether there is any good sense in which our introspective access to our own mental states is a kind of perception, something that can appropriately be called "inner sense." In my first lecture I distinguished two versions of the perception model of introspection, based on two different ...
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Phenomenalism and the Problem of Knowledge

The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1905
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