Results 211 to 220 of about 142,557 (246)
Seemings, Reasons, and Knowledge: A Defense of Phenomenal Conservatism
, 2018 Most objections to evidentialism flounder upon a bad theory of evidence. It is very common for self-styled anti-evidentialists to assume a narrow theory of evidence and then proceed to show how evidentialism—on that theory of evidence—has this or that negative consequence. This doesn’t mean that evidentialism is in the clear though.
Trent Dougherty
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Self‐Knowledge and Phenomenal Unity
Noûs, 2001 How do you know what you’re currently experiencing? How do you know that you feel pain when you do, or that something looks purple or round to you when it does? The question needs interpretation—but it is intelligible. And apparently, it’s not inconsequential: knowledge of one’s own experience seems to play an important and pervasive part in knowledge ...
Charles Siewert
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The Knowledge Argument and the Implications of Phenomenal Knowledge
Philosophy Compass, 2011 Abstract This article presents the knowledge argument against physicalism and objections to it. The focus is on the ways responses to that argument have tried to account for phenomenal knowledge within a physicalist picture. Various ‘phenomenal concepts’ strategies are considered, along with recent arguments against them.
Robert J. Howell
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1999 A comprehensive theory of implicit and explicit knowledge must explain phenomenal knowledge (e.g., knowledge regarding one's affective and motivational states), as well as propositional (i.e., “fact”-based) knowledge. Findings from several research areas (i.e., the subliminal mere exposure effect, artificial grammar learning, implicit and self ...
Robert F. Bornstein
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Qualia and phenomenal concepts as basis of the knowledge argument
Acta Analytica, 2004 The central attempt of this paper is to explain the underlying intuitions of Frank Jackson’s “Knowledge Argument” that the epistemic gap between phenomenal knowledge and physical knowledge points towards a corresponding ontological gap. The first step of my analysis is the claim that qualia are epistemically special because the acquisition of the ...
Martina Fürst
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Brain and Mind, 2002 The explanatory gap and theknowledge argument are rooted in the conflationof propositional and phenomenal knowledge. Thebasic knowledge argument is based on theconsideration that ``physical information'' aboutthe nervous system is unable to provide theknowledge of a ``color experience'' (Jackson,1982).
José M. Musacchio
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Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism
Philosophical Psychology, 2010 Sam Coleman
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Phenomenalism and the Problem of Knowledge
The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1905 Hartley Burr Alexander
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