Results 201 to 210 of about 142,557 (246)
Common Phenomenal and Neural Substrate Geometry in Visual Motion Perception
Robinson K +4 more
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Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge
, 2007 Abstract What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This book discusses these topics. All chapters focus on consciousness in the “phenomenal” sense: looking at what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that
Torin Alter, Sven Walter
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The cognitive significance of phenomenal knowledge
Philosophical Studies, 2015 Knowledge of what it’s like to have perceptual experiences, e.g. of what it’s like to see red or taste Turkish coffee, is phenomenal knowledge; and it is knowledge the substantial or significant nature of which is widely assumed to pose a challenge for physicalism. Call this the New Challenge to physicalism.
Bénédicte Veillet
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New Phenomenalism as an Account of Perceptual Knowledge
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, 1975 To be an Empiricist with respect to knowledge of the natural world, is to insist that all knowledge of that world is rooted in perceptual experience. All claims which go beyond the deliverances of the senses must, in the end, be justified by, and understood in terms of, relations holding between those claims and sensory data.
Alan Hobbs
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Non-Propositional Phenomenal Knowledge
, 2023 Abstract This chapter addresses the objection to the knowledge argument that, upon release, Mary gains only non-informational knowledge. Two versions of that objection have been developed. According to Lewis and Nemirow, when released Mary gains only non-informational ability knowledge.
Torin Alter
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Self-knowledge and “inner sense.” Lecture III: The phenomenal character of experience
, 1996 These lectures have been organized around the question of whether there is any good sense in which our introspective access to our own mental states is a kind of perception, something that can appropriately be called "inner sense." In my first lecture I distinguished two versions of the perception model of introspection, based on two different ...
Sydney Shoemaker
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