Results 131 to 140 of about 5,753 (249)

Consent and the Formation of Preferences

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Under ideal conditions, explicit consent and related actions usually change the moral facts in a distinctive way: they make something permissible that was previously impermissible. But they don't do this if the consent is coerced. And it seems they also don't do it if the preferences on which the consent is based were formed in particular ways:
Richard Pettigrew
wiley   +1 more source

Attending With Feeling: The Normative Structure of Emotional Attention

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In assessing an emotional episode, we can ask whether the intentional object of the emotion is that which the subject ought to be paying attending to. If the intentional object is not that which the subject should be paying attention to, what should be the target of normative assessment?
Juliette Vazard
wiley   +1 more source

What's Wrong With “Conceptual Amelioration”?

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Conceptual amelioration aims to make the world a more just place by ameliorating our concepts. I offer three arguments against this enterprise as currently practiced to show how social philosophy aimed at producing social change can be better practiced. First, ameliorators often fail to provide plausible stories to vindicate their claims about
Lidal Dror
wiley   +1 more source

Against Proxy Optimization

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT I discuss conditions under which maximizing a proxy utility function is harmful and suggest this poses problems for applying decision theory.
Sven Neth
wiley   +1 more source

External‐World Skepticism and the New Ethics of Belief

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT External‐world skepticism challenges, among other things, the epistemic credentials of beliefs about other people. Some external‐world skeptics deny that I know my loved ones exist; some claim that my belief that my loved ones exist is epistemically impermissible. However, abandoning this belief would be highly unattractive.
James Fritz
wiley   +1 more source

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