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Practical Reason Standards, Advice, and Practical Reason
2011This chapter considers two sorts of cases in which it might seem as though an adviser is evaluating things from within the advisee's system of standards even though this system conflicts with her own. Based on these cases, the chapter offers a positive argument in favor of the author's contention that there is no mode of sincere advice in which the ...
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2018
This chapter discusses two contemporary pictures of practical reasoning. According to the Rule-Guidance Conception, roughly, practical reasoning is a rule-guided operation of acquiring (or retaining or giving up) intentions to come to meet synchronic requirements of rationality. According to the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception, practical reasoning is,
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This chapter discusses two contemporary pictures of practical reasoning. According to the Rule-Guidance Conception, roughly, practical reasoning is a rule-guided operation of acquiring (or retaining or giving up) intentions to come to meet synchronic requirements of rationality. According to the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception, practical reasoning is,
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2000
Abstract Reasoning Practically deals with a classical philosophical topic, the link between thought and action--how we think about what we do or ought to do, and how we move from thinking to doing. The essays by such renowned contributors as Donald Davidson, Barry Stroud, Cass R.
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Abstract Reasoning Practically deals with a classical philosophical topic, the link between thought and action--how we think about what we do or ought to do, and how we move from thinking to doing. The essays by such renowned contributors as Donald Davidson, Barry Stroud, Cass R.
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Philosophy, 1942
“The will is nothing but practical reason.” In other words choice, without being any kind of judgement, resembles inference in being either valid or invalid. Moral lightness is validity of choice.
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“The will is nothing but practical reason.” In other words choice, without being any kind of judgement, resembles inference in being either valid or invalid. Moral lightness is validity of choice.
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2002
Abstract Aristotle took practical reasoning to be reasoning that concludes in an action. But an action—at least a physical one—requires more than reasoning ability; it requires physical ability too. Intending to act is as close to acting as reasoning alone can get us, so we should take practical reasoning to be reasoning that concludes ...
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Abstract Aristotle took practical reasoning to be reasoning that concludes in an action. But an action—at least a physical one—requires more than reasoning ability; it requires physical ability too. Intending to act is as close to acting as reasoning alone can get us, so we should take practical reasoning to be reasoning that concludes ...
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2017
In Ethics 4, Spinoza argues that reason commands us to preserve ourselves, to seek knowledge, and to take particular kinds of action in doing so. This invocation of reason draws upon Ethics 2 and 3 to explain the sense in which human beings will be motivated to act on these prescriptions: knowledge is for Spinoza a kind of activity, and we all possess ...
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In Ethics 4, Spinoza argues that reason commands us to preserve ourselves, to seek knowledge, and to take particular kinds of action in doing so. This invocation of reason draws upon Ethics 2 and 3 to explain the sense in which human beings will be motivated to act on these prescriptions: knowledge is for Spinoza a kind of activity, and we all possess ...
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2019
This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 33-43 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by presenting Anscombe’s argument that the premises in a practical syllogism, i.e. the considerations from which a person reasons in deciding what she will do, are not supposed to provide a proof of the conclusion that is drawn from them.
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This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 33-43 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by presenting Anscombe’s argument that the premises in a practical syllogism, i.e. the considerations from which a person reasons in deciding what she will do, are not supposed to provide a proof of the conclusion that is drawn from them.
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2008
AbstractThis chapter argues that practical reason is the ability to retain the disembedded, embedded, and embodied dimensions of rationality and to incorporate or distil them into a unified understanding or picture. It is to be able to hold and see the interrelationships between all the dimensions of that with which there is engagement, the ability to ...
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AbstractThis chapter argues that practical reason is the ability to retain the disembedded, embedded, and embodied dimensions of rationality and to incorporate or distil them into a unified understanding or picture. It is to be able to hold and see the interrelationships between all the dimensions of that with which there is engagement, the ability to ...
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2000
Abstract The distinction between practical reasoning and scientific reasoning, while wellestablished in philosophical circles, is virtually unknown among health researchers. The idea that the process of getting answers to questions about what ought to be done in the sociopolitical domain--derived from judgment, deliberation, and wisdom ...
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Abstract The distinction between practical reasoning and scientific reasoning, while wellestablished in philosophical circles, is virtually unknown among health researchers. The idea that the process of getting answers to questions about what ought to be done in the sociopolitical domain--derived from judgment, deliberation, and wisdom ...
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1999
Abstract Intentions are distinct real psychological states, not mere constructs out of beliefs and desires. One intends to do something only if one believes one will do it. Positive intentions are to be distinguished from negative and conditional intentions.
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Abstract Intentions are distinct real psychological states, not mere constructs out of beliefs and desires. One intends to do something only if one believes one will do it. Positive intentions are to be distinguished from negative and conditional intentions.
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