Results 1 to 10 of about 563,294 (216)

Reverberation effect of communication in a public goods game. [PDF]

open access: yesPLoS ONE, 2023
Using a public goods laboratory experiment, this paper analyzes the extent to which face-to-face communication keeps its efficiency gains even after its removal. This is important as communication in real world is costly (e.g. time).
Dmitri Bershadskyy
doaj   +2 more sources

Incidental Emotions and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game [PDF]

open access: yesFrontiers in Psychology, 2022
The study reported here considers the relationship between emotional state and cooperation. An experiment is conducted in which the emotions of fear, happiness, and disgust are induced using 360-degree videos, shown in virtual reality.
Yen Nguyen, Charles N. Noussair
doaj   +2 more sources

Coevolution of public goods game and networks based on survival of the fittest. [PDF]

open access: yesPLoS ONE, 2018
We introduce a random strategy update rule for the evolutionary public goods game on networks based on survival of the fittest. A survival cost parameter is introduced to public goods game.
Guangming Ren   +3 more
doaj   +2 more sources

Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long [PDF]

open access: yesGames, 2017
Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would ...
Lucas Wardil, Marco Antonio Amaral
doaj   +4 more sources

Investment preference promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game. [PDF]

open access: yesPLoS ONE, 2018
It is usually assumed that each cooperator contributes equally to different public pools in spatial public goods game. However, it is more reasonable to invest differently according to individual investment preference.
Shuhua Chang   +4 more
doaj   +2 more sources

Group-Level Selection Increases Cooperation in the Public Goods Game. [PDF]

open access: yesPLoS ONE, 2016
When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less successful groups. Group-level selection is the most extreme form of group competition, where the weaker group ceases to exist, becoming extinct.
Catherine C Eckel   +3 more
doaj   +2 more sources

Evolutionary Games and Dynamics in Public Goods Supply with Repetitive Actions

open access: yesMathematics, 2021
Based on a tripartite game model among suppliers of public goods, consumers, and the government, a tripartite repeated game model is constructed to analyze the evolution mechanism of which suppliers supply at low prices, consumers purchase, and the ...
Simo Sun   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Spontaneous associations and label framing have similar effects in the public goods game [PDF]

open access: yesJudgment and Decision Making, 2014
It is known that presentation of a meaningful label (e.g., "The Teamwork Game") can influence decisions in economic games. A common view is that such labels cue associations to preexisting mental models of situations, a process here called frame ...
Kimmo Eriksson, Pontus Strimling
doaj   +3 more sources

Asymmetric effects of social and economic incentives on cooperation in real effort based public goods games.

open access: yesPLoS ONE, 2021
Many practitioners as well as researchers explore promoting environmentally conscious behavior in the context of public goods systems. Numerous experimental studies revealed various types of incentives to increase cooperation on public goods.
Jakob Hackel   +4 more
doaj   +1 more source

Thankful or Thankless: Does the Past’s Altruism Increase the Present’s Public Good Contributions?

open access: yesGames, 2020
Two important aspects of global environmental problems are that (1) the actions of past generations affect the opportunities of the present, and (2) both in the past and the present generations, collaboration across different countries is needed to ...
Anna Lou Abatayo   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

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