Confusion remains an important issue in public goods game experiments. [PDF]
Strømland E +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Co-Evolution of Complex Network Public Goods Game under the Edges Rules. [PDF]
Sun X +6 more
europepmc +1 more source
The relationship of the source of punishment and personality traits with investment and punishment in a public goods game. [PDF]
Rodrigues J, Leipold N, Hewig J, Hein G.
europepmc +1 more source
Separating individual and group-level cooperation in the Public Goods Game. [PDF]
Nielsen YA, Pfattheicher S.
europepmc +1 more source
Reply to Fosgaard and Wengström: Confusion should not be used to explain cooperative behavior in public goods game experiments. [PDF]
Wang G, Li J, Wang W, Niu X, Wang Y.
europepmc +1 more source
The Impact of Cognitive Load on Cooperation and Antisocial Punishment: Insights from a Public Goods Game Experiment. [PDF]
Zhao Y, Li Z, Jin S, Zhang X.
europepmc +1 more source
A Heterogeneous Network Modeling Method Based on Public Goods Game Theory to Explore Cooperative Behavior in VANETs. [PDF]
Wang Q, Liu H, Jin X, Wang Z.
europepmc +1 more source
Reply to Strømland et al.: Confusion should be minimized rather than used to explain cooperation in public goods game experiments. [PDF]
Wang G, Li J, Wang W, Niu X, Wang Y.
europepmc +1 more source
The signaling role of feedback in the repeated public goods game: Experimental evidence from the laboratory. [PDF]
Liu CH, Tsai SF, Chen TC, Cheng HW.
europepmc +1 more source

