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Evolutionary Dynamics in Public Good Games
Computational Economics, 2006zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Clemens, Christiane, Riechmann, Thomas
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Charity dictator games and public goods games
2022The dataset contains all the data from the survey conducted, including the incentivised experimental questions on contributions to public goods. Data underpin an article titled 'Inequality, outreach, and impact in public goods contributions', The Journal of Development Studies. The Stata do-file contains the analysis of this dataset.
Nicholls, Nichola +2 more
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Cognitive hierarchies in threshold public good games
Theory and Decision, 2023Threshold public good games with binary contributions and without rebates or refunds embody both the incentive to free-ride and the risks of non-provision and wasted contributions. We investigate the implications of heterogeneity in strategic sophistication in this context, focusing on the cognitive hierarchy model. We find that the contribution of the
Doruk İriş, So Jin Lee, Ali I. Ozkes
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Social norms in repeated public good games
Research in Economics, 2009Abstract The paper explores the relationship between an individual’s preference for cooperation and the establishment of cooperative norms. Our aim is to provide an experimental test of the hypothesis ( Fehr and Gachter, 2002 ) according to which the individuals’ willingness to punish defectors in social dilemma games favours the establishment of a ...
SBRIGLIA, Patrizia, NESE A.
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Mixing protocols in the public goods game
Physical Review E, 2020If interaction partners in social dilemma games are not selected randomly from the population but are instead determined by a network of contacts, it has far reaching consequences for the evolutionary dynamics. Selecting partners randomly leads to a well-mixed population, where pattern formation is essentially impossible.
Maja Duh, Marko Gosak, Matjaž Perc
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Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2010It is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences how to maintain high levels of cooperation among selfish individuals. Theorists present an effective mechanism promoting cooperation by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games.
Zhaojin, Xu +2 more
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The timing effect in public good games
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2005In public good situations, expectations concerning other persons' moves are important and subtle cues can affect these expectations. In Experiment 1, participants in a public good game who moved simultaneously made high contributions and expected their opponents to make high contributions.
Abele, S., Ehrhart, K.-M.
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Expectation formation in step‐level public good games
Economic Inquiry, 2001This article focuses on the process of expectation formation. Specifically, the question is addressed whether individuals think strategically when they form beliefs about other players’behavior. Most belief learning models assume that people abstract from strategic considerations.
Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J., Schram, A.
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Pareto-optimality in linear public goods games [PDF]
We derive a generalized method for calculating the total number of Paretooptimal allocations (NOPA) in typical linear public goods games. Among other things, the method allows researchers to develop new experimental designs for testing the relevance of Pareto-optimality in experimental settings, for investigating alternative causes of the decline of ...
Sascha Hokamp, Michael Pickhardt
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Games, Conventions, and Public Goods
2002AbstractGame theory analyses the best behaviour of individuals when this depends on the reaction of others. The prisoners’ dilemma is the best‐known theorem, and has been thought to be an important reason for government intervention in markets. This is misleading because trust and conventions play a large part in oft‐repeated economic and other ...
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