Results 1 to 10 of about 5,104 (213)

Evolution of contribution timing in public goods games [PDF]

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2020
Bryce Mörsky, Marco Smolla, Erol Akçay   +2 more
exaly   +2 more sources

Public goods games in directed networks [PDF]

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021
Public goods games in undirected networks are generally known to have pure Nash equilibria, which are easy to find. In contrast, we prove that, in directed networks, a broad range of public goods games have intractable equilibrium problems: The existence of pure Nash equilibria is NP-hard to decide, and mixed Nash equilibria are PPAD-hard to find.
Christos H. Papadimitriou, Binghui Peng
openaire   +3 more sources

Frequency-dependent returns in nonlinear public goods games [PDF]

Journal of the Royal Society Interface
Christoph Hauert, Alex Mcavoy
exaly   +2 more sources

Heterogeneous resource allocation can change social hierarchy in public goods games [PDF]

Royal Society Open Science, 2017
Sandro Meloni, Chengyi Xia, Yamir Moreno   +2 more
exaly   +2 more sources

Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games? [PDF]

Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 2015
Luis Moniz Pereira, Tom Lenaerts, T A Han   +2 more
exaly   +2 more sources

Unraveling Public Good Games [PDF]

Games, 2011
This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end-game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs on contributions and allows us to conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a ...
Pablo Brañas-Garza, María Paz Espinosa
openaire   +7 more sources

Representing Others in a Public Good Game [PDF]

Games, 2015
In many important public good situations the decision-making power and authority is delegated to representatives who make binding decisions on behalf of a larger group. The purpose of this study is to compare contribution decisions made by individuals with contribution decisions made by group representatives.
Karen Evelyn Hauge, Ole Rogeberg
openaire   +4 more sources

Depreciation of public goods in spatial public goods games [PDF]

Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, 2011
In real situations, the value of public goods will be reduced or even lost because of external factors or for intrinsic reasons. In this work, we investigate the evolution of cooperation by considering the effect of depreciation of public goods in spatial public goods games on a square lattice. It is assumed that each individual gains full advantage if
Shi, D., Zhuang, Y., Li, Y., Wang, B.
openaire   +2 more sources

Benefits of tolerance in public goods games [PDF]

Physical Review E, 2015
Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a modest income for non-participants.
Szolnoki, Attila, Chen, X.
openaire   +4 more sources

Institution Formation in Public Goods Games [PDF]

American Economic Review, 2006
Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision.
Kosfeld, Michael, Okada, Akira, Riedl, Arno   +2 more
openaire   +10 more sources