Results 11 to 20 of about 5,104 (213)
The team allocator game: Allocation power in public goods games [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2021 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Alexandros Karakostas +4 more
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Emergence of cooperation in public goods games [PDF]
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2009 Evolution of cooperation has been a major issue in evolutionary biology. Cooperation is observed not only in dyadic interactions, but also in social interactions involving more than two individuals. It has been argued that direct reciprocity cannot explain the emergence of cooperation in large groups because the basin of attraction for the
Shun, Kurokawa, Yasuo, Ihara
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The emergence of coordination in public good games [PDF]
The European Physical Journal B, 2007 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Hichri, Walid, Kirman, Alan
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No-vaxxers are different in public good games
Scientific Reports, 2022 AbstractIn September 2021 we conducted a survey to 1482 people in Italy, when the vaccination campaign against Covid19 was going on. In the first part of the survey we run three simple tests on players’ behavior in standard tasks with monetary incentives to measure their risk attitudes, willingness to contribute to a public good in an experimental game,
Basili, Marcello +2 more
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Extinction rates in tumour public goods games. [PDF]
J R Soc Interface, 2017 Cancer evolution and progression are shaped by cellular interactions and Darwinian selection. Evolutionary game theory incorporates both of these principles, and has been proposed as a framework to understand tumour cell population dynamics. A cornerstone of evolutionary dynamics is the replicator equation, which describes changes in the relative ...
Gerlee P, Altrock PM.
europepmc +4 more sources
Complexity of Public Goods Games on Graphs
, 2022 We study the computational complexity of "public goods games on networks". In this model, each vertex in a graph is an agent that needs to take a binary decision of whether to "produce a good" or not. Each agent's utility depends on the number of its neighbors in the graph that produce the good, as well as on its own action.
Matan Gilboa, Noam Nisan
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Learning dynamics in public goods games [PDF]
Physical Review E, 2011 We extend recent analyses of stochastic effects in game dynamical learning to cases of multiplayer games and to games defined on networked structures. By means of an expansion in the noise strength we consider the weak-noise limit and present an analytical computation of spectral properties of fluctuations in multiplayer public goods games.
Bladon, Alex J., Galla, Tobias
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Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2007 AbstractWe exploit the aggregative structure of the public good model to provide a simple analysis of the voluntary contribution game. In contrast to the best response function approach, ours avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased, and can readily analyze games involving many heterogeneous players.
Cornes, Richard, Hartley, Roger
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Growth and Inequality in Public Good Games [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013 In a novel experimental design we study dynamic public good games in which wealth is allowed to accumulate. More precisely each agent's income at the end of a period serves as her endowment in the following period. In this setting growth and inequality arise endogenously allowing us to address new questions regarding their interplay and effect on ...
G chter, Simon +3 more
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Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion [PDF]
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2013 AbstractA group of firms decides to cooperate on a project that requires a combination of inputs held by some of them. These inputs are non‐rival but excludable goods, i.e., public goods with exclusion such as knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. We address the question of how firms should be compensated for the inputs they contribute.
DEHEZ, Pierre, TELLONE, Daniela
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