Results 51 to 60 of about 2,154,790 (237)
In this work, we study n-agent Bayesian games with m-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called linear multidimensional Bayesian games. This class of games is equivalent with n-agent, m-game uniform multigames.
Sébastien Huot, Abbas Edalat
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Payoff Shares in Two-Player Contests
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players’ shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost
Samuel Häfner, Georg Nöldeke
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V2G Scaling for Electric Trucks From a Cyber‐Physical‐Social Perspective: Challenges and Pathways
ABSTRACT Under the dual carbon strategy, electric trucks, as a key element in emission reduction within the transportation sector, can achieve a mutually beneficial situation for both the power system and the transportation system through vehicle‐to‐grid (V2G).
Jun Li +4 more
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Social conformity and equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players [PDF]
We introduce a framework of noncooperative pregames, in which players are characterized by their attributes, and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, there exist approximate (e )Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
Wooders, Myrna Holtz +2 more
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Seeing like a citizen: Experimental evidence on how empowerment affects engagement with the state
Abstract Building a strong and effective state requires revenue. Yet, in many low‐income countries, citizens do not make formal payments to the state or forego engaging with the state altogether due to vulnerability to opportunistic demands by state agents. We study two randomized interventions in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, designed to
Soeren J. Henn +4 more
wiley +1 more source
Abstract This paper investigates how politicians use the assignment of officials to geographical posts—a personnel system found in many countries—as a system of incentives to control, and possibly corrupt, bureaucratic behavior. The argument is developed with a matching model and tested with a nationwide survey of Indian officials who administer land ...
Anustubh Agnihotri +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Collusion through debt and managers
Abstract We investigate the anticompetitive effects of debt financing and managerial incentives in the presence of managers incurring personal bankruptcy costs. We characterize the strategic value for firms' shareholders of resorting to debt and managerial incentives as complementary devices to sustain collusion among firms, when managerial bankruptcy ...
Raffaele Fiocco +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Variational Inequality and Distributed Learning for a Bidding Game in Electricity Supply Markets
This study uses a game-theoretic analysis of bid-based electricity supply market equilibrium. Electricity supply markets are modeled as strategic interactions of bidders that supply electric power to the market and the bidders' pure strategies are the ...
Kwang-Ki K. Kim
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Abstract This paper studies how litigation and settlement behaviour is affected by agents motivated by spiteful preferences under the American fee‐shifting rule compared to the English one. We conduct an experiment and find that litigation expenditures are overall higher under the English rule compared to the American rule—even for low‐merit cases ...
Wladislaw Mill, Jonathan Stäbler
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A game theoretic approach to balance privacy risks and familial benefits
As recreational genomics continues to grow in its popularity, many people are afforded the opportunity to share their genomes in exchange for various services, including third-party interpretation (TPI) tools, to understand their predisposition to health
Jia Guo +7 more
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