Results 71 to 80 of about 2,154,790 (237)
Pure self-confirming equilibrium [PDF]
In a Self-Confirming Equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993A) every player obtains partial information about other players' strategies and plays a best response to some conjecture which is consistent with his information.
Azrieli, Yaron
core
Dynamic channel selection in unknown environment based on graphical game and multi-Q learning
Tongxin xuebao, 2013 For the problem of dynamic channel selection in unknown distributed environment without a priori knowledge and information exchange, multi-Q learning was proposed.
Fang-wei LI, Yong-chuan TANG, Jiang ZHU
doaj
Games, 2017 This paper generalises the Hawk-Dove evolutionary game by introducing cost sharing ratios for both players, and applies the generalised Hawk-Dove model to conflict management in projects through investigating the stability of Nash equilibria.
Sheryl Le Chang, Mikhail Prokopenko
doaj +1 more source
Incentive and Signaling Effects of Bonus Payments: An Experiment in a Company
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Economists and management scholars have argued that the scope of incentives to increase cooperation in organizations is limited as their use may signal the prevalence of free‐riding among employees. This paper tests this hypothesis with an artefactual field experiment that assigns managers and employees from a large company to stylized roles ...
Marvin Deversi, Lisa Spantig
wiley +1 more source
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium [PDF]
, 2009 A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile.
Mezzetti, Claudio +3 more
core
Наукові вісті Національного технічного університету України "Київський політехнічний інститут", 2018 Background. A problem of selecting amongst efficient Nash equilibria is solved by refining them. The existing approaches to refining do not guarantee that the refined efficient Nash equilibrium will be single.
Vadim V. Romanuke
doaj +1 more source
Evidence Gathering Under Competitive and Noncompetitive Rewards
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Reward schemes may affect not only agents' effort but also their incentives to gather information in order to reduce the riskiness of the productive activity. In a laboratory experiment using a novel task, we find that the relationship between incentives and evidence gathering depends critically on the availability of information about peers ...
Philip Brookins +2 more
wiley +1 more source
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, 2017 This article exhibits a reward-based incentive mechanism for file caching in delay-tolerant networks. In delay-tolerant networks, nodes use relay’s store-carry-forward paradigm to reach the final destination.
Sidi Ahmed Ezzahidi +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Make or Buy Decisions and Data Sharing
The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Firms can share data to discover potential synergies between their data sets and algorithms, eventually leading to more efficient mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. However, data sharing also modifies the competitive balance when firms do not merge, and a company may be reluctant to share data with potential rivals.
Antoine Dubus, Patrick Legros
wiley +1 more source
Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts
The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper analyzes optimal licensing contracts when a licensee faces the risk of future infringement claims by unknown patent holders. In a setting where a noncompeting licensor contracts with a monopolistic manufacturer, fixed‐fee licensing is optimal absent such claims.
Jay Pil Choi
wiley +1 more source