Visual Attention and Strategic Sophistication in the Strategic Environment Effect: An Eye-Tracking Approach. [PDF]
Funaki Y +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Strategic Superposition and Replicator Dynamics: Quantum Collapses in Decision Processes. [PDF]
Yolusever A.
europepmc +1 more source
Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences. [PDF]
In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Cournot–Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int.
Topuzu, Mihaela +1 more
core
Sequential game dynamics produce subgame perfect equilibria in sports networks through bounded rationality. [PDF]
Park C.
europepmc +1 more source
On the Unique Existence of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Smooth Asymmetric Contests
There can be three types of heterogeneity among players in a rent-seeking contest. First, the effectiveness of agent's effort on the winning probabilities may differ among players. Secondly, players may evaluate the rent or prize of the rent-seeking contest differently. Thirdly, players may face different financial constraints.
openaire +1 more source
More strategies, more Nash equilibria [PDF]
This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem).
Sophie Bade +2 more
core
Game-Theoretic Obfuscation of Wi-Fi MAC-Layer Traffic Against IoT Device Fingerprinting Attacks. [PDF]
Alghamdi A +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium [PDF]
In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility ...
Andreu Mas-Colell, Sergiu Hart
core
I analyse a market with adverse selection in which companies competè a la Bertrand by offering menus of contracts. Contrary to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), I allow for any finite number of types and states and more general utility functions. I define the generalised Rothschild-Stiglitz Profile of Actions (RSPA), and I show that, in every possible ...
openaire +1 more source
Risk appetite-enhanced game-theoretic approach for modelling mandatory lane-changing behaviour in freeway merging areas. [PDF]
Wang B, Wang S, He G.
europepmc +1 more source

