Results 51 to 60 of about 5,277,294 (228)
Pure strategy Nash equilibrium points and the Lefschetz fixed point theorem [PDF]
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium point existence theorem is established for a class ofn-person games with possibly nonacyclic (e.g. disconnected) strategy sets. The principal tool used in the proof is a Lefschetz fixed point theorem for multivalued maps, due to Eilenberg and Montgomery, which extends their better known. Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed point
openaire +2 more sources
Deepening the real options debate: Real options as dynamic optimization
Abstract Research Summary Is real option theory useful for management research? This topic was hotly debated two decades ago. Real options were said to be inapplicable to management research and to lack conceptual distinctiveness. Whereas responses to the claim about the non‐distinctiveness of real options were disparate, the concern about the theory's
Arkadiy V. Sakhartov +2 more
wiley +1 more source
In this work, we study n-agent Bayesian games with m-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called linear multidimensional Bayesian games. This class of games is equivalent with n-agent, m-game uniform multigames.
Sébastien Huot, Abbas Edalat
doaj +1 more source
Anti-jamming channel access in 5G ultra-dense networks: a game-theoretic learning approach
This paper investigates the Quality of Experience (QoE) oriented channel access anti-jamming problem in 5th Generation Mobile Communication (5G) ultra-dense networks.
Yunpeng Zhang +4 more
doaj +1 more source
V2G Scaling for Electric Trucks From a Cyber‐Physical‐Social Perspective: Challenges and Pathways
ABSTRACT Under the dual carbon strategy, electric trucks, as a key element in emission reduction within the transportation sector, can achieve a mutually beneficial situation for both the power system and the transportation system through vehicle‐to‐grid (V2G).
Jun Li +4 more
wiley +1 more source
Social conformity and equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players [PDF]
We introduce a framework of noncooperative pregames, in which players are characterized by their attributes, and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, there exist approximate (e )Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
Wooders, Myrna Holtz +2 more
core
Seeing like a citizen: Experimental evidence on how empowerment affects engagement with the state
Abstract Building a strong and effective state requires revenue. Yet, in many low‐income countries, citizens do not make formal payments to the state or forego engaging with the state altogether due to vulnerability to opportunistic demands by state agents. We study two randomized interventions in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, designed to
Soeren J. Henn +4 more
wiley +1 more source
Abstract This paper investigates how politicians use the assignment of officials to geographical posts—a personnel system found in many countries—as a system of incentives to control, and possibly corrupt, bureaucratic behavior. The argument is developed with a matching model and tested with a nationwide survey of Indian officials who administer land ...
Anustubh Agnihotri +2 more
wiley +1 more source
UAV-Assisted Mobile Edge Computing Task Offloading Based on Mixed-Strategy Games [PDF]
In a single UAV-assisted mobile edge computing system, in order to enable the UAV to serve all user devices in a large area, the large area can be divided into a plurality of sub-areas and the UAV can be set to fly between the sub-areas with a fixed ...
Zhu Yun, Liu Shuwen, Chen Qiang, Liao Jian, Guo Zhengyu, Lu Chunyu, Luo Delin
doaj +1 more source
Collusion through debt and managers
Abstract We investigate the anticompetitive effects of debt financing and managerial incentives in the presence of managers incurring personal bankruptcy costs. We characterize the strategic value for firms' shareholders of resorting to debt and managerial incentives as complementary devices to sustain collusion among firms, when managerial bankruptcy ...
Raffaele Fiocco +2 more
wiley +1 more source

