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The Random Oracle Model

2021
In the previous chapter we looked at dedicated forms of hash functions that we categorized as non-cryptographic hash functions. Their common denominator is that we can prove the existence of constructions that fulfill the properties (e.g., pairwise independence) without having to rely on unproven assumptions.
Arno Mittelbach, Marc Fischlin
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Correcting Subverted Random Oracles

2018
The random oracle methodology has proven to be a powerful tool for designing and reasoning about cryptographic schemes, and can often act as an effective bridge between theory and practice. In this paper, we focus on the basic problem of correcting faulty—or adversarially corrupted—random oracles, so that they can be confidently applied for such ...
Alexander Russell   +3 more
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Deterministic Random Oracles

2012
The Random Oracle model popularized by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 has proven to be hugely successful, allowing cryptographers to give security proofs for very efficient and practical schemes. In this paper, we discuss the possibility of using an incompressible but fixed, "algorithmically random" oracle instead of the standard random oracle and show ...
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Ring signatures without random oracles

Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, computer and communications security, 2006
Since the formalization of ring signature by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman in 2001, there are lots of variations appeared in the literature. Almost all of the variations rely on the random oracle model for security proof. In this paper, we propose a ring signature scheme based on bilinear pairings, which is proven to be secure against adaptive chosen ...
Sherman S. M. Chow   +3 more
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The Random Oracle Controversy

2021
Over the course of the previous chapters we have seen how random oracles allow for the creation of elegant and efficient schemes which can furthermore be proven secure in the random oracle model. In this chapter we have a closer look at what it means to have a security proof in the random oracle model rather than in the standard model.
Arno Mittelbach, Marc Fischlin
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Subquadratic SNARGs in the Random Oracle Model

2021
In a seminal work, Micali (FOCS 1994) gave the first succinct non-interactive argument (SNARG) in the random oracle model (ROM). The construction combines a PCP and a cryptographic commitment, and has several attractive features: it is plausibly post-quantum; it can be heuristically instantiated via lightweight cryptography; and it has a transparent ...
Alessandro Chiesa, Eylon Yogev
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Random Oracles in the Standard Model

2016
Provable security is a fundamental concept of modern cryptography (see, e.g., Katz and Lindell; Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Chapter 1, 2007). In order to argue about security, we first require a precise and rigorous definition of what security means (e.g., a definition of secure encryption).
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Random oracles are practical

Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '93, 1993
We argue that the random oracle model—where all parties have access to a public random oracle—provides a bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice. In the paradigm we suggest, a practical protocol P is produced by first devising and proving correct a protocol PR for the random oracle model, and then replacing oracle accesses by the
Mihir Bellare, Phillip Rogaway
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The Random Oracle Model

2010
The signature schemes described in the previous chapters, whether based on the RSA/strong RSA assumptions or bilinear maps, represent essentially the extent of what is currently known regarding efficient yet provably secure signature schemes.
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The Wonderful World of Global Random Oracles

2018
The random-oracle model by Bellare and Rogaway (CCS’93) is an indispensable tool for the security analysis of practical cryptographic protocols. However, the traditional random-oracle model fails to guarantee security when a protocol is composed with arbitrary protocols that use the same random oracle.
Jan Camenisch   +4 more
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