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Conscience, Normativity, and Rational Intuition
2020Part 1 explores David Hume’s and Francis Hutcheson’s criticisms of Clarkean ethical rationalism (CER). It also discusses modern criticisms of CER, and rational intuitionism more broadly, derived from Hutcheson and Hume, including: the fact/value distinction; moral ‘fetishism’; and, ‘queerness’Part 2 shows how CER can respond to Humean and Hutchesonian ...
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Towards a Defense of Rational Intuitions
2013Here is what we have argued so far: (i) that a commitment to the existence of authoritative rational intuitions is rationally obligatory (Chapter 1.1); (ii) that the experimentalist critique of intuitions not only fails to have any critical purchase on a theory of authoritative rational intuitions but in fact presupposes their ...
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Scaffolding Intuitive Rationality
2018Abstract In this chapter, I articulate a category of rational intuitive inference that stands between the simplest forms of association and the most complex forms of deductive reasoning. I focus especially on how intuitive inferences can be scaffolded up through successive levels of abstraction to more stimulus-independent forms of ...
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The rationality of different kinds of intuitive decision processes
Synthese, 2012Whereas classic work in judgment and decision making has focused on the deviation of intuition from rationality, more recent research has focused on the performance of intuition in real-world environments. Borrowing from both approaches, we investigate to which extent competing models of intuitive probabilistic decision making overlap with choices ...
Marc Jekel +3 more
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Strategy: Rationality, Intuition, and Accountability
Philosophy of Management, 2007In this paper, I explore the nature of strategic decision making. In particular, I am concerned with the interplay of rational reflection and intuitive insight in strategic contexts. I argue that it is in the very nature of strategic situations that they cannot be exhaustively analysed in terms of the available evidence, and that hence there always is ...
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Intuitive decisions and heuristics – an alternative rationality
Civil Engineering and Environmental Systems, 2013Two ways of making a decision are objectively using formal analysis and subjectively using intuition. Psychological research has shown that the latter leads to better decisions in complex situations. Intuitive decision-making uses simplified rules of thumb heuristics. In engineering terms, complexity implies complex systems.
Elms, David, Brown CB
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Rational Intuitions and Analytic Metaphysics
2013In the first two chapters of Part 1, we have argued (i) that a commitment to the existence of authoritative rational intuitions is rationally obligatory, and (ii) that the experimentalist critique of intuitions not only fails to have any critical purchase on a theory of authoritative rational intuitions but in fact presupposes their indispensability ...
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Philosophical and Rational Intuition
2014According to the received view, intuitions are, in epistemological and methodological sense, important as a source of a priori evidence in contemporary analytic philosophy. There is, however, an apparent ambiguity in the usage of the term ‘rational intuition’, which by some rationalists covers a so-called philosophical or classification intuition as ...
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Rational and Intuitive Frames of Reference
1977I want to talk about evidence; especially about the kind of psychological evidence that relates the emotional organisation of the individual to those aspects of intellectual performance that we refer to by means of phrases like ‘disposition’, ‘frame of mind’ or ‘frame of reference’.
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Deductive Intuitions and Lay Rationality
Journal of Philosophical Research, 2014This article is a discussion of L. Jonathan Cohen's contention that experimental psychology could not show that lay deductive competence is seriously defective.
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