Results 61 to 70 of about 486,219 (293)
Cooperative behavior is often assumed to depend on individuals' characteristics, such as altruism and reasoning ability. Evidence is mixed about what the precise impact of these characteristics is, as the subjects of study are generally randomly paired ...
Iván Barreda-Tarrazona +4 more
doaj +1 more source
Predicting extreme defects in additive manufacturing remains a key challenge limiting its structural reliability. This study proposes a statistical framework that integrates Extreme Value Theory with advanced process indicators to explore defect–process relationships and improve the estimation of critical defect sizes. The approach provides a basis for
Muhammad Muteeb Butt +8 more
wiley +1 more source
Testing Threats in Repeated Games [PDF]
I introduce a solution concept for infinite-horizon games, called “Nash equilibrium with added tests”, in which players optimize with respect to relevant threats only after having tested them before.
Ran Spiegler
core +3 more sources
Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputation [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Salomon, Antoine, Forges, Françoise
openaire +5 more sources
The tribological behavior of 100Cr6 steel spheres textured via Vickers microindentation is evaluated under lubricated sliding by varying both dimple size and density. Fine and dense textures significantly reduce friction across all lubrication regimes, while large dimples increase it.
Farideh Davoodi +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games
This paper examines how to construct subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted repeated games with perfect monitoring. We introduce a relatively simple class of strategy profiles that are easy to compute and may give rise to a large set of ...
Kimmo Berg, Gijs Schoenmakers
doaj +1 more source
Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games [PDF]
In a companion paper [`Learning to play equilibrium', Northwestern University, Evanston (1990)], the authors show that utility maximizing players, holding subjective beliefs about their opponents' strategies in an infinitely repeated game, must converge to a subjective equilibrium. At such an equilibrium, players' forecasts on the actual future play of
Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer
openaire +3 more sources
The corrosion performance of AlSi7Mg and AlSi10Mg alloys produced through selective laser melting (SLM) was examined under compressive stress in a chloride environment. Electrochemical analyses, including open‐circuit potential (OCP), potentiodynamic polarization (CPP), and electrochemical impedance spectroscopy (EIS), were complemented by scanning ...
Femi John Akinfolarin +2 more
wiley +1 more source
A Lyapunov Optimization Approach to Repeated Stochastic Games [PDF]
This paper considers a time-varying game with $N$ players. Every time slot, players observe their own random events and then take a control action. The events and control actions affect the individual utilities earned by each player.
Neely, Michael J.
core +2 more sources
Relaxing Exclusive Control in Boolean Games [PDF]
In the typical framework for boolean games (BG) each player can change the truth value of some propositional atoms, while attempting to make her goal true.
Francesco Belardinelli +6 more
doaj +1 more source

