Results 51 to 60 of about 1,383,828 (332)
Background Active video games have been embraced for the rehabilitation of mobility and promotion of physical activity for persons post-stroke. This study seeks to compare carefully matched standard of care stepping activities, off-the-shelf (non-custom)
Judith E. Deutsch +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex post equilibria. In our equilibria, players
Takuo Sugaya, Y. Yamamoto
semanticscholar +1 more source
Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games [PDF]
In a companion paper [`Learning to play equilibrium', Northwestern University, Evanston (1990)], the authors show that utility maximizing players, holding subjective beliefs about their opponents' strategies in an infinitely repeated game, must converge to a subjective equilibrium. At such an equilibrium, players' forecasts on the actual future play of
Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer
openaire +3 more sources
Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity
This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity–or respect–towards their competitors.
Doruk İriş, Luís Santos-Pinto
doaj +1 more source
From repeated games to Brownian games [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +3 more sources
A Gradient-Based Reinforcement Learning Algorithm for Multiple Cooperative Agents
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) can be used to design intelligent agents for solving cooperative tasks. Within the MARL category, this paper proposes the probability of maximal reward based on the infinitesimal gradient ascent (PMR-IGA ...
Zhen Zhang +4 more
doaj +1 more source
Communication and cooperation in repeated games [PDF]
We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set ofε‐coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (ε‐CCE) of the underlying one‐shot game. The value ofεdepends on the discount factor and the quality of monitoring.
Awaya, Yu, Krishna, Vijay
openaire +3 more sources
Repeated games with one-memory [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Mehmet Barlo +2 more
openaire +5 more sources
On Adaptive Heuristics that Converge to Correlated Equilibrium
I study the path properties of adaptive heuristics that mimic the natural dynamics of play in a game and converge to the set of correlated equilibria. Despite their apparent differences, I show that these heuristics have an abstract representation as a ...
Ayan Bhattacharya
doaj +1 more source
Cooperation between Emotional Players
This paper uses the framework of stochastic games to propose a model of emotions in repeated interactions. An emotional player can be in either a friendly, a neutral, or a hostile state of mind.
Lina Andersson
doaj +1 more source

