Results 211 to 220 of about 2,944 (259)
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On the Metainferential Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes

Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2022
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Semantic Regularity and the Liar Paradox

Monist, The, 2006
Nicholas J J Smith, Smith Nicholas J J
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Two semantical paradoxes

Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1955
Consider the statement:(1) What I am saying cannot be proved.Let us suppose that this statement can be proved. Then it must be true, i.e., in its own words, it cannot be proved, which contradicts our supposition.Therefore the statement cannot be proved, since our supposition has led to a contradiction. In other words, the statement is true. In this way
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Semantic paradoxes as equations

The Mathematical Intelligencer, 2001
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PARADOXES AND SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION

1986
Many researchers in Computer Science, Linguistics, Logic, and Philosophy have been discovering in various ways that analogues of the Liar paradox pose deep foundational problems for intensional semantics. In this survey paper I state my own view of what the problems are, and try to provide a broad perspective on the issues, with many references to the ...
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The Innocence of Truth in Semantic Paradox

Erkenntnis, 2019
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Semantic Paradoxes

2018
All abstracts over-simplify. But the truth is close to the following: the ancient Greeks, true to stereotype, pioneered semantic paradoxes. There was no indigenous awareness of them east of the Euphrates River. They emerged piecemeal from the Greek love of irony and holistically from the Greek ambition to encompass the whole Truth.
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Sorites Paradoxes and the Semantics of Vagueness

Philosophical Perspectives, 1994
via a million applications of modus ponens and universal instantiation. To treat this line of reasoning as a reductio of the denial of (1) is to concede that 'bald' is not vague, and hence, in the general case, to concede that no predicates are vague. This conclusion is, of course, itself paradoxical. What, then, has gone wrong? In this paper I want to
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The ‘Semantic Paradoxes’

1992
The traditional approach to studying the origin of the so-called non-Logical ‘paradoxes’ was to treat them as immediate consequences of the logical ones discovered by Russell. Since most historians associate the discovery of these new ‘paradoxes’ with scholars such as George G.
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