Results 1 to 10 of about 327 (244)
Gene networks and liar paradoxes. [PDF]
AbstractNetwork motifs are small patterns of connections, found over‐represented in gene regulatory networks. An example is the negative feedback loop (e.g. factor A represses itself). This opposes its own state so that when ‘on’ it tends towards ‘off’ – and vice versa.
Isalan M.
europepmc +5 more sources
This essay delivers a serious message on life, at the core of reasoning, to wit, “I am a liar” self-destructive infests reasoning to undermine it to fill life with oxymora, then proposes a singing way out in music. This essay is naturally divided into three sections: one, how self-destructive the liar paradox is life-ubiquitous; two, the liar paradox ...
Kuang-Ming Wu
exaly +3 more sources
A Nontransitive Theory of Truth over PA
David Ripley has argued extensively for a nontransitive theory of truth by dropping the rule of Cut in a sequent calculus setting in order to get around triviality caused by paradoxes such as the Liar.
Jonathan Dittrich
doaj +1 more source
Buridan’s Sophisms, Alethic Predicates and Anaphoric Prosententialism [PDF]
The article presents a unified method for diagnosis and treatment various semantic pathologies (Buridan’s sophisms, Liar-like sentences, etc.). The basis of this approach is a modified version of prosententialism, in which the terms ʽtrueʼ and ʽfalseʼ
A. V. Nekhaev
doaj +1 more source
The liar paradox is an ancient logical paradox (revisited by modern thinkers) which links truth with falsehood and falsehood with truth, and is based on a self-referential mechanism.
Alessandro Di Caro
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Uncut is a book about two kinds of paradoxes: paradoxes involving truth and its relatives, like the liar paradox, and paradoxes involving vagueness.
David Ripley
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Truth-Teller–Liar Puzzles with Self-Reference
In this paper, we use commonsense reasoning and graph representation to study logical puzzles with three types of people. Strong Truth-Tellers say only true atomic statements, Strong Liars say only false atomic statements, and Strong Crazy people say ...
Laith Alzboon, Benedek Nagy
doaj +1 more source
The Logic of the Self-Refutation Argument in Dissoi Logoi 4.6
Dissoi Logoi 4.6 presents a beautiful self-refutation argument, which I analyse here, offering a different assessment of its relation to self-contradiction and the Liar paradox from the only one available in the literature.
Sebastiano Molinelli
doaj +1 more source
Should God believe the Liar? A non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s Omniscience
In this paper, we discuss a family of arguments that show the inconsistency of the concept of omniscience, which is one of the central attributes of the theistic God.
GUILHERME ARAÚJO CARDOSO +1 more
doaj +1 more source

