Results 11 to 20 of about 392 (229)
Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions [PDF]
Abstract We consider a private-value auction with one-sided incomplete information in which two objects are sold in a sequence of two second-price auctions. The buyers have multiunit demand and are asymmetrically informed at the ex ante stage of the game. One buyer perfectly knows his type, and the other buyer is uninformed about her own
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Sequential auctions and auction revenue
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Cabral, Luis, Salant, David J.
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Bidding decision in land auction using prospect theory
Land auction is widely practiced in company and government decisions, especially in China. Bidders are always faced with two or more auctions in the period of a decision cycle. The outcome of the auction is under high risk. The bidder's risk attitude and
Yanyan Peng, Xinwang Liu
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In many natural settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not simultaneous. In such auctions, future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players. The goal of this paper is to develop a quantitative understanding of outcomes of such sequential auctions. In earlier work (Paes Leme et al.
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos
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Comparative Analysis of Sequential and Combinatorial Auctions Based on Petri Nets
An auction is a crucial resource allocation mechanism for a supply chain and includes the purchasing price at the winner's bid value, eligible suppliers in winning bidder sets, and business payment terms. A multi-object auction usually involves two types
Xiaodan Zhang +4 more
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Timing and presentation effects in sequential auctions
This paper investigates two hitherto unexplored dimensions inherent in online sequential auctions, namely, how the time elapsed between the end of an auction and the end of the next one and the order of presentation on the website affect prices ...
Ola Andersson, Tommy Andersson
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Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: An Experimental Investigation
We conduct a laboratory experiment where groups of 4 subjects constrained to obtain at most one good each, sequentially bid for three goods in first and second price auctions.
F. Javier Otamendi +2 more
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Submitted - sswp829 ...
Bernhardt, Dan, Scoones, David
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Loss aversion in sequential auctions
I analyze sequential auctions with expectations‐based loss‐averse bidders who have independent private values and unit demand. Equilibrium bids are history dependent and subject to a “discouragement effect”: the higher is the winning bid in the current round, the less aggressive are the bids of the remaining bidders in the next round. Moreover, because
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Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction [PDF]
In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders’ types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of ?rst-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private ...
Ding, Wei +2 more
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