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Dynamics and Coalitions in Sequential Games [PDF]
We consider N-player non-zero sum games played on finite trees (i.e., sequential games), in which the players have the right to repeatedly update their respective strategies (for instance, to improve the outcome wrt to the current strategy profile). This
Thomas Brihaye +3 more
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Infinite sequential Nash equilibrium [PDF]
In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play in turn.
Stephane Le Roux
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Stationary Anonymous Sequential Games with Undiscounted Rewards. [PDF]
Stationary anonymous sequential games with undiscounted rewards are a special class of games that combine features from both population games (infinitely many players) with stochastic games. We extend the theory for these games to the cases of total expected reward as well as to the expected average reward. We show that in the anonymous sequential game
Więcek P, Altman E.
europepmc +7 more sources
Discounting in Games across Time Scales [PDF]
We introduce two-level discounted games played by two players on a perfect-information stochastic game graph. The upper level game is a discounted game and the lower level game is an undiscounted reachability game.
Krishnendu Chatterjee, Rupak Majumdar
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SEQUENTIAL TWO‐PLAYER GAMES WITH AMBIGUITY* [PDF]
If players' beliefs are strictly nonadditive, the Dempster–Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two‐person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster–Shafer updating rule.
Eichberger, Jürgen, Kelsey, David
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Estimation of finite sequential games [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Shiko Maruyama
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Sequential equlibria in signaling games
The paper considers Bayesian multi-stage signaling games. Previously formulated for extensive-form games, concepts of sequential equilibrium, separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium are specified, and calculating methods for these equilibria are also discussed.
Vasin, A. A., Seregina, I. Yu.
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In real-time strategy (RTS) games, to defeat their opponents, players need to choose and implement the correct sequential actions. Because RTS games like StarCraft II are real-time, players have a very limited time to choose how to develop their strategy.
Changhyun Kim +7 more
doaj +1 more source
Economic Harmony—A Rational Theory of Fairness and Cooperation in Strategic Interactions
Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game ...
Ramzi Suleiman
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Sequential Majoritarian Blotto Games [PDF]
We study Colonel Blotto games with sequential battles and a majoritarian objective. For a large class of contest success functions, the equilibrium is unique and characterized by an even split: Each battle that is reached before one of the players wins a majority of battles is allocated the same amount of resources from the player’s overall budget.
Klumpp, T., Konrad, K.
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