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On (Subgame Perfect) Secure Equilibrium in Quantitative Reachability Games [PDF]
We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible.
Thomas Brihaye +3 more
doaj +4 more sources
A Characterization of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Plays in Borel Games of Perfect Information [PDF]
We provide a characterization of subgame-perfect equilibrium plays in a class of perfect information games where each player's payoff function is Borel measurable and has finite range.
János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski
exaly +3 more sources
Alternating-Offers Bargaining with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns [PDF]
The Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining game is reconsidered, where players show fairness concerns and their fairness references are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution.
Zhongwei Feng, Fangning Li, Chunqiao Tan
doaj +2 more sources
Cournot–Walras equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Francesca Busetto +2 more
exaly +7 more sources
On refinements of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium [PDF]
The concept of subgame perfect -equilibrium (-SPE), where is an error-term, has in recent years emerged as a prominent solution concept for perfect information games of infinite duration.
Flesch, Janos +3 more
core +5 more sources
On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games
Steg J-H. On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games. Games and Economic Behavior. 2022;135:74-78.In Smirnov and Wait (2021), an iterative method is devised to identify subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of timing games.
Steg, Jan-Henrik ; https://orcid.org/
core +3 more sources
Infinite Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Hausdorff Difference Hierarchy [PDF]
The alternative definition of the difference hierarchy has changed ...
Stéphane Le Roux, Le Roux Stéphane
exaly +4 more sources
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game with Loss Aversion
Rubinstein bargaining game is extended to incorporate loss aversion, where the initial reference points are not zero. Under the assumption that the highest rejected proposal of the opponent last periods is regarded as the associated reference point, we ...
Zhongwei Feng, Chunqiao Tan
doaj +3 more sources
Playing Extensive Games with Learning of Opponent’s Cognition [PDF]
Decision-making is a basic component of agents’ (e.g., intelligent sensors) behaviors, in which one’s cognition plays a crucial role in the process and outcome.
Chanjuan Liu +3 more
doaj +2 more sources
Undercut-proof Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of a Pricing Game [PDF]
Two firms selling a homogenous product to two types of buyers are involved in a sequential pricing game with zero costs. The pricing strategy available involves a fixed price and a royalty.
Jaideep Roy, Debabrata Datta
core +4 more sources

