Cournot–Walras equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Sayantan Ghosal +2 more
exaly +8 more sources
On refinements of subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibrium [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
János Flesch +2 more
exaly +5 more sources
On (Subgame Perfect) Secure Equilibrium in Quantitative Reachability Games [PDF]
We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible.
Thomas Brihaye +3 more
doaj +5 more sources
A Characterization of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Plays in Borel Games of Perfect Information [PDF]
We provide a characterization of subgame-perfect equilibrium plays in a class of perfect information games where each player’s payoff function is Borel measurable and has finite range. The set of subgame-perfect equilibrium plays is obtained through a process of iterative elimination of plays.
János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski
exaly +4 more sources
Non-existence of subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
János Flesch +2 more
exaly +5 more sources
Alternating-Offers Bargaining with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns [PDF]
The Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining game is reconsidered, where players show fairness concerns and their fairness references are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution.
Zhongwei Feng, Fangning Li, Chunqiao Tan
doaj +2 more sources
Infinite Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Hausdorff Difference Hierarchy [PDF]
The alternative definition of the difference hierarchy has changed ...
Stéphane Le Roux, Le Roux Stéphane
exaly +4 more sources
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game with Loss Aversion
Rubinstein bargaining game is extended to incorporate loss aversion, where the initial reference points are not zero. Under the assumption that the highest rejected proposal of the opponent last periods is regarded as the associated reference point, we ...
Zhongwei Feng, Chunqiao Tan
doaj +3 more sources
Playing Extensive Games with Learning of Opponent’s Cognition [PDF]
Decision-making is a basic component of agents’ (e.g., intelligent sensors) behaviors, in which one’s cognition plays a crucial role in the process and outcome.
Chanjuan Liu +3 more
doaj +2 more sources
Simulation of ultimatum game with artificial intelligence and biases
In this research we have developed experimental designs of the ultimatum game with supervised agents. This agents have unbiased and biased thinking depending on the case. We used Reinforcement Learning and Bucket Brigade to program the artficial agentes.
Julio Añasco +3 more
doaj +1 more source

