On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game [PDF]
In this paper we provide an exact non-cooperative foundation of the Nash solution via a unique (weakly) subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vector in a two-person bargaining game, which is a modification of the well-known alternate offer game by ...
Papatya Duman, Walter Trockel
doaj +8 more sources
Alternating-Offers Bargaining with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns [PDF]
The Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining game is reconsidered, where players show fairness concerns and their fairness references are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution.
Zhongwei Feng, Fangning Li, Chunqiao Tan
doaj +2 more sources
On (Subgame Perfect) Secure Equilibrium in Quantitative Reachability Games [PDF]
We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible.
Thomas Brihaye +3 more
doaj +2 more sources
Fuzzy-Based Privacy-Preserving Scheme of Low Consumption and High Effectiveness for IoTs: A Repeated Game Model [PDF]
In the Internet of things (IoTs), data transmission via network coding is highly vulnerable to intra-generation and inter-generation pollution attacks. To mitigate such attacks, some resource-intensive privacy-preserving schemes have been adopted in the ...
Laicheng Cao, Min Zhu
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The evolution of morality and the role of commitment [PDF]
A considerable share of the literature on the evolution of human cooperation considers the question why we have not evolved to play the Nash equilibrium in prisoners’ dilemmas or public goods games.
Aslihan Akdeniz, Matthijs van Veelen
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A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty [PDF]
We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the ...
Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa
core +3 more sources
We study a two-population strategic queueing game in a double-ended system with nonzero matching times, where agents choose to join or balk. The resulting multi-dimensional state complicates analysis, but it can be shown that one dimension can be omitted in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium strategies are threshold-based.
Hung Q Nguyen, Tuan Phung-Duc
exaly +3 more sources
Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, weakly, as a Nash equilibrium and then as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could
Indrajit Ray
exaly +2 more sources
Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer
We examine a bargaining game in which players cannot make arbitrary offers. Instead, players alternately decide whether to accept or delay, and are rewarded with an indivisible portion and a perishable transfer that depends on the round.
Jijian Fan
doaj +1 more source
Network Externalities and Downstream Collusion under Asymmetric Costs: A Note
This paper considers the collusive stability of downstream competition in a vertical market with network externalities and cost asymmetry. A dynamic collusion game is constructed, and backward induction is employed to solve the subgame perfect Nash ...
Jen-Yao Lee +2 more
doaj +1 more source

