On gamesmen and fair men: explaining fairness in non-cooperative bargaining games [PDF]
Experiments on bargaining games have repeatedly shown that subjects fail to use backward induction, and that they only rarely make demands in accordance with the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Ramzi Suleiman
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A symbolic shortest path algorithm for computing subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
Consider games where players wish to minimize the cost to reach some state. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium can be regarded as a collection of optimal paths on such games.
Góngora Pedro A., Rosenblueth David A.
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Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competition
This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes under simultaneous and sequential output setting in a mixed duopoly in a vertically differentiated market. When the timing of the output game is determined endogenously, it is shown that simultaneous play in ...
Feng Leidong, Gu Mengdi
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FogCom:SDN-enabled fog node selection for early detection of communicable diseases
A communicable illness is one that spreads from person to person by a number of means, including contact with blood and body fluids, inhaling an airborne virus, or being bitten by an insect.
Joy Lal Sarkar +8 more
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Economic Harmony—A Rational Theory of Fairness and Cooperation in Strategic Interactions
Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game ...
Ramzi Suleiman
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Optimal Portfolio Selection of Mean-Variance Utility with Stochastic Interest Rate
In order to tackle the problem of how investors in financial markets allocate wealth to stochastic interest rate governed by a nested stochastic differential equations (SDEs), this paper employs the Nash equilibrium theory of the subgame perfect ...
Shuang Li +4 more
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Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation
This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition—a group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we
Takaaki Abe +2 more
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Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game with Loss Aversion
Rubinstein bargaining game is extended to incorporate loss aversion, where the initial reference points are not zero. Under the assumption that the highest rejected proposal of the opponent last periods is regarded as the associated reference point, we ...
Zhongwei Feng, Chunqiao Tan
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Two-Player Location Game in a Closed-Loop Market with Quantity Competition
This paper considers the two-player location game in a closed-loop market with quantity competition. Based on the Cournot and Hotelling models, a circle model is established for a closed-loop market in which two players (firms) play a location game under
Xiaofeng Chen +2 more
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Dynamics and Coalitions in Sequential Games [PDF]
We consider N-player non-zero sum games played on finite trees (i.e., sequential games), in which the players have the right to repeatedly update their respective strategies (for instance, to improve the outcome wrt to the current strategy profile). This
Thomas Brihaye +3 more
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