Results 11 to 20 of about 2,716 (210)

On Identifying Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Outcomes for Timing Games [PDF]

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2022
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Steg, Jan-Henrik ; https://orcid.org/
openaire   +3 more sources

Undercut-Proof Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of a Pricing Game [PDF]

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2001
Two firms selling a homogenous product to two types of buyers are involved in a sequential pricing game with zero costs. The pricing strategy available involves a fixed price and a royalty. It is shown that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with positive profits to both firms if and only if buyers differ significantly in their ...
Roy, Jaideep, Datta, Debabrata
openaire   +5 more sources

Solution of mathematical programming formulations of subgame perfect equilibrium problems [PDF]

open access: yes, 1992
Mathematical programming models have been developed to represent imperfectly competitive (oligopolistic) market structures and the interdependencies of decision-making units in establishing prices and production levels. The solution of these models represents an economic equilibrium.
Macal, C. M., Hurter, A. P.
openaire   +4 more sources

A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Reinforcement Learning Approach to Time-inconsistent Problems [PDF]

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
In this paper, we establish a subgame perfect equilibrium reinforcement learning (SPERL) framework for time-inconsistent (TIC) problems. In the context of RL, TIC problems are known to face two main challenges: the non-existence of natural recursive relationships between value functions at different time points and the violation of Bellman's principle ...
Nixie S. Lesmana, Chi Seng Pun
openaire   +3 more sources

Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer

open access: yesGames, 2023
We examine a bargaining game in which players cannot make arbitrary offers. Instead, players alternately decide whether to accept or delay, and are rewarded with an indivisible portion and a perishable transfer that depends on the round.
Jijian Fan
doaj   +1 more source

Constrained Existence Problem for Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria with ω-Regular Boolean Objectives [PDF]

open access: yesElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, 2018
We study multiplayer turn-based games played on a finite directed graph such that each player aims at satisfying an omega-regular Boolean objective. Instead of the well-known notions of Nash equilibrium (NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), we ...
Thomas Brihaye   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Subgame Consistent Cooperative Behavior in an Extensive form Game with Chance Moves

open access: yesMathematics, 2020
We design a mechanism of the players’ sustainable cooperation in multistage n-person game in the extensive form with chance moves. When the players agreed to cooperate in a dynamic game they have to ensure time consistency of the long-term cooperative ...
Denis Kuzyutin, Nadezhda Smirnova
doaj   +1 more source

Network Externalities and Downstream Collusion under Asymmetric Costs: A Note

open access: yesGames, 2023
This paper considers the collusive stability of downstream competition in a vertical market with network externalities and cost asymmetry. A dynamic collusion game is constructed, and backward induction is employed to solve the subgame perfect Nash ...
Jen-Yao Lee   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting

open access: yesGames, 2022
This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents’ decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following ...
Marina Bánnikova   +1 more
doaj   +1 more source

Optimal Segmentation over a Generalized Customer Distribution

open access: yesAxioms, 2021
This paper investigates the impact of consumer preferences on the intensity of competition for companies in a duopoly market. A classical Hotelling’s competition problem will be different if consumers are allowed to distribute non-uniformly.
Tsung-Yin Ou, Yenming J. Chen
doaj   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy