Results 11 to 20 of about 2,714 (212)

Non-Existence of Subgame-Perfect ε-Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games with Infinite Horizon [PDF]

open access: yesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2014
Every finite extensive-form game with perfect information has a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this note we settle to the negative an open problem regarding the existence of a subgame-perfect e e\varepsilon -equilibrium in perfect information games with
Shmaya, E.   +6 more
core   +3 more sources

Solution of mathematical programming formulations of subgame perfect equilibrium problems [PDF]

open access: yes, 1992
Mathematical programming models have been developed to represent imperfectly competitive (oligopolistic) market structures and the interdependencies of decision-making units in establishing prices and production levels.
Hurter, A. P., Macal, C. M.
core   +3 more sources

Simulation of ultimatum game with artificial intelligence and biases

open access: yesACI Avances en Ciencias e Ingenierías, 2023
In this research we have developed experimental designs of the ultimatum game with supervised agents. This agents have unbiased and biased thinking depending on the case. We used Reinforcement Learning and Bucket Brigade to program the artficial agentes.
Julio Añasco   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty [PDF]

open access: yes, 2000
We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i.
Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa
core   +2 more sources

Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer

open access: yesGames, 2023
We examine a bargaining game in which players cannot make arbitrary offers. Instead, players alternately decide whether to accept or delay, and are rewarded with an indivisible portion and a perishable transfer that depends on the round.
Jijian Fan
doaj   +1 more source

A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Reinforcement Learning Approach to Time-inconsistent Problems [PDF]

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
In this paper, we establish a subgame perfect equilibrium reinforcement learning (SPERL) framework for time-inconsistent (TIC) problems. In the context of RL, TIC problems are known to face two main challenges: the non-existence of natural recursive relationships between value functions at different time points and the violation of Bellman's principle ...
Nixie S. Lesmana, Chi Seng Pun
openaire   +3 more sources

Constrained Existence Problem for Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria with ω-Regular Boolean Objectives [PDF]

open access: yesElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, 2018
We study multiplayer turn-based games played on a finite directed graph such that each player aims at satisfying an omega-regular Boolean objective. Instead of the well-known notions of Nash equilibrium (NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), we ...
Thomas Brihaye   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Subgame Consistent Cooperative Behavior in an Extensive form Game with Chance Moves

open access: yesMathematics, 2020
We design a mechanism of the players’ sustainable cooperation in multistage n-person game in the extensive form with chance moves. When the players agreed to cooperate in a dynamic game they have to ensure time consistency of the long-term cooperative ...
Denis Kuzyutin, Nadezhda Smirnova
doaj   +1 more source

Network Externalities and Downstream Collusion under Asymmetric Costs: A Note

open access: yesGames, 2023
This paper considers the collusive stability of downstream competition in a vertical market with network externalities and cost asymmetry. A dynamic collusion game is constructed, and backward induction is employed to solve the subgame perfect Nash ...
Jen-Yao Lee   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting

open access: yesGames, 2022
This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents’ decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following ...
Marina Bánnikova   +1 more
doaj   +1 more source

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