Alternating-Offers Bargaining with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns [PDF]
The Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining game is reconsidered, where players show fairness concerns and their fairness references are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution.
Zhongwei Feng, Fangning Li, Chunqiao Tan
doaj +2 more sources
Playing Extensive Games with Learning of Opponent’s Cognition [PDF]
Decision-making is a basic component of agents’ (e.g., intelligent sensors) behaviors, in which one’s cognition plays a crucial role in the process and outcome.
Chanjuan Liu +3 more
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Simulation of ultimatum game with artificial intelligence and biases
In this research we have developed experimental designs of the ultimatum game with supervised agents. This agents have unbiased and biased thinking depending on the case. We used Reinforcement Learning and Bucket Brigade to program the artficial agentes.
Julio Añasco +3 more
doaj +1 more source
On (Subgame Perfect) Secure Equilibrium in Quantitative Reachability Games [PDF]
We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible.
Thomas Brihaye +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Constrained Existence Problem for Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria with ω-Regular Boolean Objectives [PDF]
We study multiplayer turn-based games played on a finite directed graph such that each player aims at satisfying an omega-regular Boolean objective. Instead of the well-known notions of Nash equilibrium (NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), we ...
Thomas Brihaye +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer
We examine a bargaining game in which players cannot make arbitrary offers. Instead, players alternately decide whether to accept or delay, and are rewarded with an indivisible portion and a perishable transfer that depends on the round.
Jijian Fan
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Subgame Consistent Cooperative Behavior in an Extensive form Game with Chance Moves
We design a mechanism of the players’ sustainable cooperation in multistage n-person game in the extensive form with chance moves. When the players agreed to cooperate in a dynamic game they have to ensure time consistency of the long-term cooperative ...
Denis Kuzyutin, Nadezhda Smirnova
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Network Externalities and Downstream Collusion under Asymmetric Costs: A Note
This paper considers the collusive stability of downstream competition in a vertical market with network externalities and cost asymmetry. A dynamic collusion game is constructed, and backward induction is employed to solve the subgame perfect Nash ...
Jen-Yao Lee +2 more
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The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting
This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents’ decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following ...
Marina Bánnikova +1 more
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Optimal Segmentation over a Generalized Customer Distribution
This paper investigates the impact of consumer preferences on the intensity of competition for companies in a duopoly market. A classical Hotelling’s competition problem will be different if consumers are allowed to distribute non-uniformly.
Tsung-Yin Ou, Yenming J. Chen
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